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FEDERAL REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURAL
BIOTECHNOLOGIES
Thomas 0. McGarity*

The scientific community in the United States, barely a decade ago, witnessed a great public debate about a new kind of
scientific research using "recombinant DNA" techniques. 1 In the
intervening years, the controversy over the possible hazards of
that research has dimmed, 2 but we have launched into another
full-scale debate over the risks and benefits of the technologies
that have grown out of that research. Perhaps the most intense
controversy has centered on agricultural uses of newly emerging
biotechnologies. 3 Although agricultural biotechnologies will un• William Stamps Farish Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law. B.A.,
1971, Rice University; J.D., 1974, University of Texas.
The author would like to express his appreciation to Dr. David Espeseth, Mr. Mike
Lidsky, Ms. Margaret Mellon, Mr. Edward Raleigh, and other members of the Keystone
Biotechnology Project who offered comments on an earlier draft of this article. Raenell
Silcox and JoAnn Kilduff provided valuable research assistance. The author, however,
must take final credit and blame for any errors contained herein.
1. See J. GOODFIELD, PLAYING Goo (1977); M. ROGERS, BIOHAZARD (1973); N. WADE,
THE ULTIMATE EXPERIMENT (1977).
2. See Levin, Changing Views of the Hazards of Recombinant DNA Manipulation
and the Regulation of these Procedures, 7 RECOMBINANT DNA TECHNICAL BULL. 107
(1984).
3. See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight and the Subcomm. on Natural Resources,
Agriculture Research and Environment and the Subcomm. on Science, Research and
Technology of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 135
(1986) [hereinafter Coordinated Framework Hearing]; Planned Releases of GeneticallyAltered Organisms: The Status of Government Research and Regulation: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House Comm. on Science
and Technology, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1985) [hereinafter Planned Release Hearing];
Biotechnology Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 98-193 (1984)
[hereinafter Biotechnology Regulation Hearing]; Environmental Implications of Genetic Engineering: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight and
the Subcomm. on Science, Research and Technology of the House Comm. on Science
and Technology, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1983) [hereinafter Environmental Implications Hearing]; STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT OF THE HOUSE
COMM. ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON ISSUES IN THE FEDERAL REGULATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY: FROM RESEARCH TO RELEASE (Comm. Print 1986)
[hereinafter ISSUES IN FEDERAL REGULATION REPORT]; STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 99TH CONG., 2D

1089

1090

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 20:4

questionably provide large benefits to farmers, food processors,
agricultural supply companies, and consumers, they may also
cause unanticipated harm. The environmental risks of highly
touted chemical pesticides that emerged after World War II did
not become apparent until long after those pesticides had become an almost indispensable component of modern agriculture.
The data base assembled during the 1950's and 1960's on the
risks of pesticides was not nearly up to the task of evaluating
their risks, and regulatory agencies are still playing catch-up in
the 1980's. Ironically, one of the most highly proclaimed benefits
of agricultural biotechnology is its potential to reduce or eliminate the need for the chemical pesticides and fertilizers that
only thirty years ago promised a "green revolution" in
agriculture.
If we can implement an effective process for assessing and
managing the risks of agricultural biotechnologies, we may perhaps avoid the unpleasant history of chemical pesticides. The
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have recently established
policies and proposed regulations aimed at implementing an effective regulatory process under existing statutes. Although their
efforts represent a sound beginning, the existing regulatory regime is still inadequate. Additional administrative action can fill
some of the gaps, but a fully effective regulatory regime may require congressional attention.
Part I of this Article describes some of the risks and benefits
of newly emerging agricultural biotechnologies. After discussing,
in Part II, the role of federal agencies in regulating agricultural
biotechnologies, Part III of the Article proposes elements for an
adequate regulatory regime. Part IV then measures the existing
legal authorities, as implemented by the USDA and the EPA,
against the ideal elements. Part V examines the willingness of
these agencies to regulate. Finally, Part VI suggests changes that
can be made in the current regulatory regime to bring about
more effective regulation and to enhance public trust in regulatory decisions.

SESS., REPORT ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS OF GENETIC ENGINEERING

Print 1984) [hereinafter

GENETIC ENGINEERING].

(Comm.
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THE BENEFITS AND RISKS OF AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY"

Agricultural biotechnology encompasses a bewildering variety
of agricultural applications of genetic engineering to agriculture,
including biological pesticides, animal biologics, genetically engineered crops, and microorganisms designed to produce soil nutrients. All of these possible uses for biotechnology may have numerous benefits to society, but many pose potential risks as well.

4. I will use the term "biotechnology" here in a very simplistic way to denote the use
of modern or "novel" techniques, such as recombinant DNA, for modifying genetic material in plants or microorganisms to achieve socially desirable results. I will use the term
"agricultural biotechnology" to refer to modern genetic engineering technologies that are
directly applicable to agriculture, and I will confine my attention to genetically engineered microorganisms and plants.
The standard definitions of biotechnology are generally drawn in a broader fashion
than this to include traditional fermentation and breeding technologies. See, e.g., U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BIOTECHNOLOGY: AGRICULTURE'S REGULATORY SYSTEM NEEDS
CLARIFICATION 8-9 (1986) [hereinafter GAO USDA REPORT]. I have narrowed the scope of
the definition for purposes of this Article to facilitate the discussion of the risks and
benefits of modern biotechnologies. I do not mean to imply that modern biotechnologies
are necessarily more hazardous (or even more useful) than traditional biotechnologies;
nor do I mean to imply that the use of modern techniques to produce an agriculturally
useful product will necessarily have any impact on the regulatory approach taken to the
product. It may well be that an adequate regulatory regime for organisms using novel
biotechnologies is likewise appropriate for organisms using traditional biotechnologies.
I mean to exclude from the discussion traditional animal and plant breeding techniques, including those fairly recent technologies that use radiation or chemicals to induce mutations in tissue cells. For the most part, I will focus on technologies that are
capable of inserting a gene from one organism into another. Although modern biotechnologies may someday be used to genetically engineer farm animals, I will not focus on
genetically engineered higher animals in this Article. Finally, I will not discuss fermentation technologies that might be used to produce agriculturally useful chemical products
such as animal hormones, fertilizers, and animal drugs.
One further limitation is required to keep this Article manageable. I will not analyze
the regulation of agricultural biotechnologies by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA). The clearest application of the FDA's authority to agricultural biotechnology is
the production of pest and disease resistant plants. Pest and disease resistance is usually
induced by breeding the plant to synthesize toxic chemicals. In large enough quantities
such chemicals can be toxic to humans and livestock who eat the crops. There is, of
course, a natural incentive for a plant breeder not to breed a crop that is toxic to the
intended consumers of the crop. Although using modern genetic engineering techniques
to breed pest and disease resistant crops clearly comes within my definition of "agricultural biotechnology," I will not address the applicability of the FDA's authority to this
problem. See generally McNamara, FDA Regulation of Food Substances Produced by
New Techniques of Biotechnology, 42 Fooo DRUG CosM. L.J. 50 (1987).
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Benefits of Agricultural Biotechnology

Agricultural biotechnology can produce biological pesticides
that are highly selective and therefore not as likely to cause adverse environmental side effects as chemical pesticides.& Similarly, microorganisms might be designed to control soil pH and
salinity, thus effectively increasing the geographical range of
many crops. 6 Modified bacteria may someday replace chemical
fertilizers. Nitrogen fixing bacteria coexist symbiotically with
certain legumes, such as soybeans, and genetic engineering techniques may enhance their nitrogen fixing capabilities. Indeed, a
company has very recently given the EPA notice of its intent to
field test such a microorganism. 7 It may even be possible to
modify nitrogen fixing bacteria and algae to provide nitrogen for
plants that lack a symbiotic relationship with currently existing
nitrogen fixing bacteria. 8
Genetic engineering techniques can help protect farm animals
from disease. For example, scientists are attempting to design
"subunit" vaccines to prevent viral animal diseases (such as foot
and mouth disease and rabies) without placing the animal at
risk of contracting the disease against which it is vaccinated. 9
Biotechnology is already beginning to yield suitable vaccines for
bacterial animal diseases (such as scours and swine dysentery)
which cause millions of dollars of damage annually. 10
Genetic engineering techniques can also be applied directly to
plants to improve yields. 11 Traditional plant breeding biotech5. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 183-84 (1984)
[hereinafter OTA COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT].
6. Id. at 180.
7. See Crawford, BioTechnica Tests EPA Review Process, 235 SCIENCE 840 (1987);
U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Fact Sheet: EPA Receives First Notice for a Microorganism Subject to Section 5 of the Toxic Substances Control Act (Feb. 6, 1987) [hereinafter EPA Fact Sheet].
8. OTA COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT, supra note 5, at 181-82; GENETIC ENGINEERING, supra note 3.
9. See OTA COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT, supra note 5, at 162-67; GAO
USDA REPORT, supra note 4, at 12. Subunit vaccines use only a few components of an
infective organism to elicit antibodies. These components are incapable of infecting the
host organism.
10. OTA COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT, supra note 5, at 162-67. The USDA
has already licensed 17 products resulting from modern biotechnologies, including five
bacterins and bacterin-toxoids to prevent scours in swine and one modified live virus
vaccine to prevent pseudorabies in swine. Comments of David Espeseth, Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA (Apr. 9, 1987) (commenting on an earlier draft
of this Article) [hereinafter Espeseth Comments].
11. Doyle, Biotechnology Research and Agricultural Stability, 2 lssuEs IN Sc1. &
TECH. 111, 114 (1985).
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nologies have greatly increased yields of commercially useful
crops by selecting for plants that produce more of the commercially useful plant part (e.g., tubers in the case of potatoes; seeds
in the case of sunflowers). 12 Similarly, traditional technologies
have allowed seed companies to develop breeds that are much
easier to harvest and process, thus reducing the ultimate expense of putting food on the table of the consumer. 13 Finally,
traditional plant breeders have been able to select for plants
that have a higher resistance to insects, disease, and drought. 1 •
Although modern biotechnologies will not replace traditional
plant breeding, they can be used together to "speed up and perfect the process of genetic refinement." 111
In addition, modern biotechnologies may be capable of achieving results that are unattainable with traditional biotechnologies. For example, genetic engineers may be able to devise new
herbicide resistant strains of crops that facilitate minimum tillage agriculture. 16 Moreover, scientists can insert into plants
genes from bacteria that cause the plants to produce proteins
that are toxic to insects. 17 Finally, scientists may soon be able to
improve plant biological processes, such as photosynthesis. 18

B. Risks of Agricultural Biotechnologies
Although most genetically engineered microorganisms will
probably not be dangerous, most scientists agree that some deliberate releases may pose health and environmental risks under
some conditions. 19 Unlike chemicals, microorganisms proliferate
12. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, IMPACTS OF APPLIED GENETICS 137-39 (1981)
[hereinafter OTA IMPACTS REPORT].
13. J. DoYLE, ALTERED HARVEST 58-59 (1985). It is not clear that the consumer receives the full benefit of the reduced expense. Some would argue that a great deal of the
savings is absorbed by food processors. Id. at 352-53.
14. GENETIC ENGINEERING, supra note 3, at 14; J. DOYLE, supra note 13, at 187; GAO
USDA REPORT, supra note 4, at 12-13.
15. OTA IMPACTS REPORT, supra note 12, at 141.
16. See Birenbaum, Pesticide and Herbicide Chemists Advised to Utilize Biotech
Techniques, Genetic Engineering News, Nov./Dec. 1986, at 12, col. 1. The USDA recently approved a request to field test a tobacco plant that had been genetically engineered to be resistant to the herbicide atrazine. Sun, Biotech Guidelines Challenged by
Rifkin, 233 SCIENCE 516 (1986).
17. See Doyle, supra note 11, at 117-19; Rigi, Field Test of Gene Altered Pest Resistant Plant Begins, Genetic Engineering News, Oct. 1986, at 1, col. 1.
18. Doyle, supra note 11, at 114.
19. A House Committee Staff report identifies the following kinds of risks posed by
large-scale release of biotechnologies: "(1) ecological disruption due to lack of natural
enemies; (2) infectivity, pathogenicity, or toxicity to nontarget organisms ... and (3)
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when released into the environment. Unless the scope and conditions of initial releases of genetically engineered microorganisms are carefully limited, they can upset delicate ecological
balances.
If genetically engineered pesticides, for example, are not selective for particular pests, or if they mutate so as to lose that selectivity, they can become hazardous to beneficial species or
even to humans. One of the first genetically engineered pesticides is a bacterium that lives on the roots of corn plants. A
chemical company engineered the bacterium to secrete a chemical that kills cutworms. 20 In reality, the bacterium is a pesticide
applicator, and it apparently applies its pesticide continuously,
whether or not the crop damaging insects are present in the
field. Clearly, this pesticide has the potential to disrupt ecological systems. 21 Moreover, constant exposure of insects to the
toxin will no doubt induce resistance among target insect species
over time.
Microorganisms designed to modify soil pH and to add nutrients to the soil could cause environmental damage if they found
a niche in soils not used for crops or if they modified the pH or
increased the nutrient content of lakes and waterways. Such microorganisms would have to be carefully engineered to remain
where they were most useful. 22
Even though genetically engineered vaccines are likely to be
safer for the host animals than current vaccines, things can go
wrong. Live vaccines can mutate in the host into harmful organisms. 23 Two benign viruses can recombine within animal
hosts to produce a deadly virus, although this is normally quite
rare. It is also possible that live genetically engineered microorganisms that are harmless to domestic livestock pose risks to
wildlife.
Any genetically engineered microorganism may be capable (either as designed or through mutation) of attacking other microexchange of genetic material with other organisms." GENETIC ENGINEERING, supra note 3,
at 16.
20. See Doyle, supra note 11, at 118; Sun, Monsanto May Bypass NIH in Microbe
Test, 227 SCIENCE 153 (1985).
21. Doyle, supra note 11, at 118.
22. See generally GENETIC ENGINEERING, supra note 3, at 15.
23. For example, when two nonpathogenic fungi were combined in an effort to enhance the nitrogen fixing capability of a species of pine tree, the combination was pathogenic and killed seedlings to which it was applied. GENETIC ENGINEERING, supra note 3, at
19 (citing Giles & Whitehead, Reassociation of a Modified Mycurrhza with the Host
Plant Roots (Pinus Radiata) and the Transfer of Acetylene Reduction Activity, 48
PLANT & SOIL 143-52 (1977)).
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organisms, plants, and animals in unanticipated ways. 24 For
example, even a nonpathogenic genetically engineered microorganism might outcompete beneficial species for available food
supplies, thereby reducing populations of beneficial species. H As
novel genetic engineering techniques begin to produce exotic
strains of microorganisms, it is always possible that one strain
will find an ecological niche and cause harm to the environment. 26 Microorganisms can be quite unpredictable in complex
ecosystems, and the histories of the introduction of exotic organisms into new ecosystems clearly demonstrate that novel species are capable of upsetting delicate ecQlogical balances. 27 Indeed, the introduction of a genetically engineered microorganism
into a new environment may pose greater risks than the introduction of an existing exotic species because so little is known
about novel organisms. 28 Some microorganisms are "promiscuous," sharing DNA with one another. 29 A genetically engineered
bacterium that was designed to secrete an enzyme under carefully limited conditions might exchange the gene coding for that
enzyme with a "wild" bacterium that would then secrete the enzyme under different conditions and cause environmental
damage.
Genetically engineered plants can also cause economic and
ecological harm if they proliferate in places where they are not
wanted. One person's flower is another person's weed. For example, corn is regarded as a weed in a sorghum field. The kudzu
vine, which was imported from Japan for soil conservation purposes, took over nearly every embankment in the Southeast
United States, and then marched on to conquer trees and telephone poles. 30 It is remotely possible that genes in a genetically
24. GAO USDA REPORT, supra note 4, at 13.
25. See Coordinated Framework Hearing, supra note 3, at 83 (testimony of Elliott A.
Norse, Director, Public Affairs Office, Ecological Soc'y of Am.).
26. See GENETIC ENGINEERING, supra note 3, at 5. The microorganisms that cause
dutch elm disease and chestnut blight thrived in the United States after they entered
the country in wood imported from Asia. Environmental Implications Hearing, supra
note 3, at 25 (testimony of Frances E. Sharples, Oak Ridge Nat'l Laboratory, Oak Ridge,
Tenn.).
27. Coordinated Framework Hearing, supra note 3, at 79-81 (testimony of Elliott A.
Norse, Director, Public Affairs Office, Ecological Soc'y of Am.); Environmental Implications Hearing, supra note 3, at 22-28 (testimony of Frances E. Sharples, Oak Ridge Nat'l
Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn.).
28. See generally Environmental Implications Hearing, supra note 3, at 5 (testimony of Martin Alexander, Professor of Agronomy, Cornell Univ.).
29. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, GENETIC ISSUES IN ENVIRONMENTAL APPLICATIONS OF GENETICALLY ALTERED ORGANISMS 10-11 (1986) [hereinafter OTA GENETIC lsSUES REPORT).
30. See GENETIC ENGINEERING, supra note 3, at 19.
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engineered crop species will move into weeds or other noncultivated vegetation, thereby bestowing on the weed the advantage
that the gene gave the crop species. 31
Traditional plant breeding techniques attempt to select for
disease and pest resistance. In many cases this is simply a matter of breeding plants that best synthesize chemicals that are
toxic to disease-producing microorganisms and other pests. 32
Modern genetic engineering techniques may produce crops that
synthesize much larger quantities of such toxic substances and
thereby render them toxic to wildlife. 33 Yet many ecologists
would probably agree that the potential for unanticipated harm
is less for genetically engineered plants than for genetically engineered microorganisms. 34
Finally, agricultural biotechnologies may have an indirect impact on the environment not immediately attributable to the
modified plants or organisms. For example, at least one scientist
has suggested that rather than designing weed-specific herbicides, seed companies should use genetic engineering techniques
to make several beneficial plant species resistant to herbicides. 35
Broad-spectrum herbicides could then be used to eliminate a
wide variety of potential weed species, leaving the economically
useful species intact. Such an approach might encourage the
overuse of herbicides, resulting in damage to wildlife, water supplies, and ultimately human beings. 36 On the other hand, it
might encourage use of more benign herbicides that currently do
not adequately differentiate between weeds and crops. 37
31. Planned Release Hearing, supra note 3, at 54 (prepared statement of Robert M.
Goodman, Vice President, Research & Dev., Calgene, Inc.). Several species that are normally considered weeds, such as wild sunflowers and Johnson grass, are used as sources
of genetic variation in plant breeding programs. Id. at 59, 63. Because crops can interbreed with related species of weeds, the genetic material of crops can become incorporated into weeds.
32. See, e.g., Balandrin, Klocke, Wurtele & Bollinger, Natural Plant Chemicals:
Sources of Industrial and Medicinal Materials, 228 SCIENCE 1154 (1985).
33. Seed companies would probably not develop disease and pest resistant crops that
were intended for human or animal consumption. That would, of course, be self-defeating. But many crops, such as ornamental species, are not directly consumed by humans,
and many that are consumed by humans and livestock have uses other than human or
livestock consumption. For example, if energy prices return to the 1970's levels, much
corn will be grown to produce alcohol for fuel.
34. OTA GENETIC ISSUES REPORT, supra note 29, at 11; Planned Release Hearing,
supra note 3, at 54, 91 (prepared statement and testimony of Robert M. Goodman, Vice
President, Research & Dev., Calgene, Inc.).
35. See Birenbaum, supra note 16.
36. See Doyle, supra note 11, at 119-20.
37. Comments of Margaret Mellon, Staff Attorney, National Wildlife Federation
(Mar. 23, 1987) (commenting on an earlier draft of this Article) [hereinafter Mellon
Comments).
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In sum, although the potential risks of modern agricultural
biotechnologies are highly speculative, they are quite real. 38 If

problems do occur, they may be severe. Thus, like nuclear power
and some synthetic chemicals, agricultural biotechnologies pose
low-probability, high-consequence risks, the magnitude of which
will continue to be highly uncertain. 39
II.

THE ROLE OF FEDERAL AGENCIES IN REGULATING
AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGIES

In the past, the USDA has played a significant role in promoting agricultural biotechnologies, and it will play an increasingly
prominent role in regulating them. The Agricultural Research
Service devotes approximately $450 million per year to agricultural research, including $24.5 million in fiscal year 1986 for
projects using modern biotechnologies. ' 0 The Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service (APHIS) administers several statutes
aimed at protecting agricultural crops and livestock, consumers
of food, and the general environment from harmful plants and
microorganisms.
Under the Virus-Serum-Toxin Act, 41 it is unlawful to transport or import a "worthless, contaminated, dangerous, or harmful virus, serum, toxin, or analogous product intended for use in
the treatment of domestic animals." 42 Establishments that manufacture veterinary biological products must be licensed, and
importers must have permits.' 3 The USDA has issued regulations banning the shipment within the United States of individual products unless the manufacturer has satisfied USDA requirements for purity, safety, potency, and efficacy.'" In effect,
38. Planned Release Hearing, supra note 3, at 40 (prepared statement of Martin Alexander, Professor of Agronomy, Cornell Univ.).
39. Environmental Implications Hearing, supra note 3, at 9 (prepared statement by
Martin Alexander, Professor of Agronomy, Cornell Univ.); Harlow, The EPA and Biotechnology Regulation: Coping with Scientific Uncertainty, 95 YALE L.J. 553,559 (1986);
McGarity & Bayer, Federal Regulation of Emerging Genetic Technologies, 36 VAND. L.
REV. 461, 486 (1983).
40. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BIOTECHNOLOGY: ANALYSIS OF FEDERALLY FUNDED
RESEARCH 14 (1986).
41. 21 U.S.C. §§ 151-158 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
42. Id. § 151. The original statute barred only the interstate shipment of harmful
products, but the Food Security Act of 1985 expanded the USDA's authority to include
intrastate shipments. Pub. L. No. 99-198, § 1768, 99 Stat. 1654 (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 151, 154-154a, 157, 159 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
43. 21 U.S.C. §§ 154-155 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
44. 9 C.F.R. § 113 (1987).
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the USDA has established a licensing regime for manufacturing
establishments, imports, and individual products.
The Act of February 2, 1903, empowers the USDA to issue
regulations and to take appropriate measures against the import
or interstate transport of animal diseases. 45 The USDA has interpreted this statute to give it authority to require a permit for
any import or interstate shipment of contagious or infectious
diseases of animals. 46
The Federal Plant Pest Act (FPPA) 47 empowers the USDA to
regulate imports and movement within the United States of
plant pests, which may be microorganisms, plants, or insects.
Any import or shipment within the United States of designated
plant pests must have a permit. 48 In addition, the Noxious Weed
Act49 requires a permit for the importation or interstate shipment of noxious weeds that have been listed by the USDA pursuant to somewhat cumbersome procedures. 50
Finally, the recently enacted Food Security Act111 gives the
USDA very broad authority to "establish appropriate controls
with respect to the development and use of the application of
biotechnology to agriculture.'' 112 Although this extremely broad
grant of authority was probably intended merely to give the
USDA authority to protect the environment from USDA-sponsored research, the statute is not by its terms so limited, 53 and
the USDA has not decided whether it will rely on the statute to
bolster its other authorities. 114 However, because the quoted sec45. 21 u.s.c. § 111 (1982).
46. 9 C.F.R. § 122 (1987).
47. 7 U.S.C. §§ 150aa-150jj (1982).
48. 7 C.F.R. § 330.200 (1987).
49. 7 u.s.c. §§ 2801-2813 (1982).
50. Id. § 2803. The term "noxious weed" is defined broadly to include any living
stage of any plant that is "of foreign origin, is new to or not widely prevalent in the
United States, and can directly or indirectly injure" crops or other "interests of agriculture, including ... fish and wildlife resources." Id. § 2802(c). Because the USDA believes that it has adequate authority to regulate plants that pose risks to agricultural
crops under the Federal Plant Pest Act, Id. §§ 150aa-150jj, and the Plant Quarantine
Act, Id. §§ 151-167, and because the Noxious Weed Act is limited to weeds "of foreign
origin," the agency has not relied heavily on the Noxious Weed Act in asserting its authority over agricultural biotechnologies.
51. Id. §§ 3121-3150 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
52. Id. § 3121(12).
53. This narrower reading of the Act is supported by the fact that it does not establish any of the normal elements of a regulatory program, such as hearing procedures,
permit requirements, penalties, and inspection authority. Telephone interview with
Terry Medley, Director, Biotechnology and Environmental Coordination Staff, Animal
and Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA (Feb. 10, 1987) [hereinafter Medley
Interview].
54. Id.
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tion of the Food Security Act amended only the National Agricultural Research, Extension, and Teaching Policy Act of 1977 / 11
it probably does not go beyond USDA-sponsored research and
associated regulatory programs. 116
Until very recently, the USDA did not actively exercise the
foregoing powers because there were no proposals for large-scale
use of modern agricultural biotechnologies. 117 Recognizing that it
will soon play a major role in regulating agricultural biotechnologies, the Department has established within the APHIS a Biotechnology Environmental Coordination Staff that is responsible
for coordinating the Department's regulatory activities and for
ensuring that they are consistent with departmental policies and
with the National Environmental Policy Act. 58
Congress transferred regulatory authority for pesticides from
the USDA to the EPA in 1970. Under the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 119 no person may distribute a pesticide unless it has been "registered" with the EPA.
The Act defines the term "pesticide" very broadly to include any
substance "intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or
mitigating any pest" or "intended for use as a plant regulator,
defoliant, or desicant." 80 To obtain a registration for a pesticide,
the registrant must demonstrate that it will not pose an "unreasonable risk" to humans or the environment.
The EPA's authority to regulate chemical substances under
the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) 61 may also have a role
in regulating agricultural biotechnology. Any manufacturer of ei55. Pub. L. No. 95-113, tit. 14, 91 Stat. 913, 981 (1977) (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. §§ 3101-3336 (1982 & Supp. IV (1986)).
56. A. Carr, A Critique of the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Policy on Biotechnology Research and Regulation 5 (Congressional Research Serv. May 30, 1986) (paper prepared at the request of the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House
Comm. on Science and Technology); Medley Interview, supra note 53.
57. The Department did, however, condition its research grants for projects involving
recombinant DNA on compliance with the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Guidelines for Recombinant DNA Research. Biotechnology Regulation Hearing, supra note 3,
at 136 (testimony of Orville G. Bentley, Assistant Secretary for Science and Educ.,
USDA). After receiving criticism from the General Accounting Office for relying upon
the NIH guidelines, which were aimed more at biomedical than agricultural research, the
USDA has recently issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking suggesting its own
guidelines for agricultural research. Advanced Notice of Proposed USDA Guidelines for
Biotechnology Research, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,367 (1986).
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Medley Interview, supra note
53. When fully staffed, the Biotechnology Environmental Coordination Staff will consist
of microbiologists, plant pathologists, environmental specialists, and a program analyst
and regulatory specialist. Id.
59. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
60. Id. § 136(u).
61. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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ther a new chemical substance or a significant new use of an existing chemical substance must file a notice with the EPA. The
EPA may then require that the substance be tested for adverse
health and environmental effects, and it can prevent the manufacture and distribution of the substance during the testing pe. riod. Any time that the EPA finds that a chemical substance
presents an "unreasonable risk" of injury to humans or to the
environment, it may promulgate a rule regulating the manufacture, distribution, and use of the substance. The EPA has interpreted the broad definition of "chemical substance" in the
TSCA to include genetically engineered microorganisms, but
this reading is not free from controversy. 62
By the early 1980's, it became clear that modern biotechnologies would play a major role in producing useful agricultural
products. Unlike previous technologies such as the automobile or
the video cassette recorder that were introduced into the market
with little or no governmental interference, biotechnology already had a history of state and federal regulation at the research and development stage. Biotechnology proponents therefore expected regulation, and they sought out the appropriate
agencies before attempting to introduce the technologies into
commerce. They soon discovered, however, that no single statute
was aimed specifically at the risks of biotechnology, and they
were frustrated to find several overlapping authorities. Moreover, the relevant agencies had given little thought to how their
statutes might apply to biotechnology, and they had undertaken
few efforts to eliminate gaps in coverage or to reduce overlaps.
The Reagan administration soon formed an interagency working group, called the Domestic Policy Council Working Group on
Biotechnology, charged with drafting an overall federal framework for regulating biotechnology. The working group finished
its job in June 1986, when it published a "Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology" and an associated group
of agency policy statements and proposed rules. 63 Concluding
that existing statutes gave the federal government adequate authority to regulate biotechnology, the working group recommended against any statutory change. This Article critically examines the working group's sanguine assessment in the context
of agricultural biotechnologies.
62. See infra text accompanying notes 122-28.
63. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302
(1986) [hereinafter Coordinated Framework].
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ELEMENTS OF AN ADEQUATE REGULATORY REGIME

Before identifying the elements of an adequate regulatory regime, it is worth exploring why there should be any regulatory
regime at all for agricultural biotechnology. Inevitably, any regulation of agricultural biotechnology will slow down its progress
and thereby deprive society of its benefits. In our market-oriented society, it is often presumed that there must be good reasons for regulation, and those reasons can guide the search for
the best regulatory tools.
The primary reason for regulating agricultural biotechnology
is to reduce the risks that at least some agricultural biotechnologies pose to humans and to the general environment. Past experience with new technologies, such as agricultural pesticides and
nuclear power, argue against assuming that agricultural biotechnologies will be entirely benign. Yet society could allow the market, through the indirect incentives of the tort system, to regulate agricultural biotechnology without interference from
regulatory agencies.
The tort system, however, is not likely to provide adequate
incentives for reducing the risks of large-scale releases of genetically engineered microorganisms. 64 As with synthetic chemicals,
it may be difficult to establish cause-effect relationships between
genetically engineered microorganisms and environmental damage. If experts would generally be unwilling to testify that the
release of a microorganism "probably" caused a plaintiff's damage, there would be no recovery, and hence no incentive to reduce risks. Even if causation could be established, the tort system would not send an adequate message unless all injured
persons sued and all responsible parties were subject to suit. 6 ~
The tort system will not address harm to the environment at all
unless the technology also causes economic damage. When the
ecology is thrown out of balance, there may be no individual
with a sufficient direct financial stake to finance a lawsuit. Perhaps more importantly, the tort system generally works only after the fact; it is not well adapted to preventing harm before it
occurs. 66
64. For an assessment of the efficacy of the tort system in controlling chemical risks,
see McGarity, Media Quality, Technology, and Cost-Benefit Strategies for Health and
Environmental Regulation, 46 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 159, 173-79 (1983).
65. See id. at 17 4-75. Many of the new agricultural biotechnology companies are
small entities that are not highly capitalized. Bankruptcy laws effectively shield such
companies from full responsibility for the harm caused by their products.
66. See id. at 175-76.
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The case for regulation is not as clear with genetically engineered plants. Economic damage due to genetically engineered
plants that become weeds is probably fairly easily established.
Because scientists seem less concerned that genetically engineered plants will cause large-scale uncompensable harm, 67 the
after the fact aspect of the tort system would be less objectionable. On the other hand, the tort system would still lack incentives to reduce ecological harm that did not cause economic loss.
Whether or not society erects a regulatory mechanism to prevent harm from genetically engineered plants and microorganisms is ultimately a policy question that must be informed by
technical considerations, but not dominated by them. 68 Perceptions, more than scientific facts, are likely to dictate the choice.
At this stage in the development of biotechnology, public perceptions are poorly informed and ill defined. The public will
probably insist upon a regulatory regime for microorganisms. Although the question is closer, policymakers may desire to err on
the side of safety and provide some sort of regulatory regime for
genetically engineered plants as well. The following discussion
assumes that the decision has been made to erect a regulatory
regime beyond that provided by the tort system, but it recognizes that the scope and intrusiveness of that regime might vary
depending upon whether plants or microorganisms are involved.
The elements of an adequate regulatory regime for biotechnology set out below are not necessarily exhaustive, and an adequate regulatory regime need not include every one of them. Ultimately, what constitutes an adequate regulatory regime is a
policy question that Congress must resolve.
A.

Prerelease Notice

A comprehensive regulatory regime would require manufacturers to inform the regulatory agency in advance of releasing a
novel genetically engineered plant or microorganism into the environment. Such advance notification would give the agency an
opportunity to decide whether to exercise its regulatory power.
67. The slight possibility that genetic engineering will create a food plant that poisons people is probably best addressed through traditional statutes regulating adulterated food. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 342 (1982). This topic is
beyond the scope of this Article.
68. Harlow, supra note 39, at 560; McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion
in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in
EPA and OSHA, 67 GEo. L.J. 729 (1979).
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Without prerelease notification, the agency can only assume a
reactive mode, perhaps after harm has resulted from the release.
The information included in prerelease notice might vary, depending upon the nature of the plant or organism. For example,
an identification of the host organism and an accurate characterization of the inserted DNA would seem to be the minimum information necessary. The location and circumstances surrounding the release are also fundamental. Beyond that, the
information required might depend upon the suspected hazard.
As the agency acquired more experience with classes of plants or
organisms, less information might be required, and in time the
entire prerelease notice might be waived for whole classes of
plants and microorganisms.
Beyond the obvious burden imposed by the prerelease filing
requirements, the most significant disadvantage of prerelease
notification is the potential that it has for revealing valuable
trade secrets. 69 Although all federal agencies have the power to
protect legitimate trade secrets from disclosure, 70 information is
sometimes released inadvertently; additionally, the public interest often requires that the affected public be provided information that might otherwise be considered a trade secret. 11 Nevertheless, policymakers may decide that inconvenience to
manufacturers from the risk of disclosing trade secrets is outweighed by the advantages of prerelease notification.

B.

Data Collection, Data Evaluation, and Risk Assessment

An adequate regulatory regime would have some mechanism
for producing information relevant to the health and environmental effects of agricultural biotechnologies. 72 Either the regulated entity or the agency itself should conduct studies on surrogate systems in laboratories and greenhouses prior to deliberate
69. The complicated and delicate subject of the secrecy of trade information that is
germane to evaluating the environmental effects of new technologies is beyond the scope
of this Article. See generally McGarity & Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health
and Safety Testing Information: Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 837 (1980). The inquiry here will simply focus on the authority and the ability of
the agencies to protect legitimate trade secrets.
70. The Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1982), prohibits federal employees from
releasing trade secrets. The Supreme Court has held that the Trade Secrets Act provides
authority for an agency to withhold trade secret information, absent an explicit congressional command to release it. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
71. See McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 69, at 840-48.
72. See McGarity & Bayer, supra note 39, at 474-75.
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release of genetically engineered plants and microorganisms into
the environment. 78 Dr. Martin Alexander, a microbial ecologist,
has suggested that an adequate risk assessment would be based
upon information addressed to the following four questions:
(1) the possibility that the organism will survive following its release, (2) the likelihood that it will multiply in
some natural environment or in farmed areas, (3) the
possibility that it will be dispersed and make contact
with species that it can injure, and (4) the chance that it
will be harmful. 74
Unfortunately, there are presently no standardized guidelines
for evaluating the potential of microorganisms to cause ecological damage. 76 At least during the first few years, protocols for
such studies should probably be determined on a case by case
basis, and the studies should be undertaken in carefully controlled test plots. 78
In addition to gathering data, the agency must have the capacity to evaluate the quality of those data, analyze them, and
draw scientifically valid conclusions. These functions require
73. Planned Release Hearing, supra note 3, at 55 (prepared statement of Robert M.
Goodman, Vice President, Research & Dev., Calgene, Inc.) ("Introduction of new crop
varieties requires testing in many different environments over a period of several
years."); id. at 82 (testimony of Robert K. Colwell, Professor of Zoology, University of
Cal., Berkeley, Cal.) (suggesting a series of questions that should be asked about genetically engineered microorganisms before they are released into the environment).
74. Id. at 40.
75. Environmental Implications Hearing, supra note 3, at 220 (statement of Frances .
E. Sharples, Oak Ridge Nat'l Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn.). Dr. Alexander has concluded that we are lacking ail adequate body of information upon which to base
regulation:
What is needed, therefore, is information on the potential for survival, multiplication, dispersal, and deleterious effects of the range of species of present and
future interest to specialists in biotechnology, as well as a series of generally
accepted tests that evaluate these phenomena . . . . It is in these two areas-developing a data base and a series of generally accepted tests-that essentially nothing has happened within the past 30 months.
Planned Release Hearing, supra note 3, at 40-41.
76. A statutory requirement that manufacturers of genetically engineered agricultural
products provide the results of health and safety testing to a regulatory agency raises the
complex question of the trade secret status of this information. Clearly, potential competitors should not be allowed to use the original manufacturer's information to obtain a
license or other governmental advantage. The regulatory regime should therefore provide
some mechanism for protecting the original manufacturer's legitimate interest in recouping its financial investment in the information without at the same time depriving the
appropriate regulatory agency and the public of access to data that may be essential for
an appropriate evaluation of the safety of the product. See McGarity & Bayer, supra
note 39, at 475-76; see generally McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 69. This Article will
not discuss this question in detail.
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both a mechanism for ensuring that the data are produced in
accordance with sound scientific protocols and expertise in evaluating the quality of scientific information. Typically, regulatory
agencies with data evaluation responsibilities hire a staff of qualified experts. In addition, many agencies establish advisory committees composed of prominent scientists to evaluate information and to provide advice on the soundness of the agency's
conclusions. Some agencies also circulate important scientific
data for peer review to scientists selected by the agency staff.
Finally, the regulatory agency should use the information that
it gathers to assess the risks posed by deliberate releases of agricultural biotechnologies. 77 At present, the art of risk assessment
for biotechnology is very primitive indeed. 78 The Ecological Society of America has testified that:
[T]here is currently no definitive way to predict ...
what an organism will do when modified and released
into the environment, for two reasons. For one, because
the genetic engineering processes are, to varying degrees,
imprecise, we do not know precisely what the products
will be . . . . The other reason is that even if genetic engineers always knew precisely the nature and function of
the genes they were transferring, it does not follow that
they-or anyone else at this point-could then predict
with sufficient assurance the fate and effects of the modified organism when it is released. 79
Because the risks are likely to be of the low probability, high
consequence variety that plagues regulators in other areas, it
may be most appropriate to assess the risks of agricultural biotechnologies at first on a case by case basis prior to deliberate
release. 80 This would require information on the pathogenicity of
77. See ISSUES IN FEDERAL REGULATION REPORT, supra note 3, at 29-36 (discussing
Advanced Genetic Science's unauthorized experiments releasing into the environment
the 'ice-minus' microbe and suggesting several factors to be implemented by EPA in
reviewing proposals to release genetically engineered organisms into the environment);
Harlow, supra note 39, at 563; McGarity & Bayer, supra note 39, at 478-80.
78. See Planned Releases Hearing, supra note 3, at 4-5; Harlow, supra note 39, at
560-63; Stotzky & Babich, Fate of Genetically-Engineered Microbes in Natural Environments, 7 RECOMBINANT DNA TECHNICAL BULL. 163 (1984).
79. Coordinated Framework Hearing, supra note 3, at 81; see also Harlow, supra
note 39, at 560-63 (pointing out the science policy aspects of risk assessments for largescale releases of genetically engineered microorganisms).
80. See Coordinated Framework Hearing, supra note 3, at 19 (testimony of David T.
Kingsbury, National Science Found.); id. at 71 (testimony of Monica Riley, American
Soc'y for Microbiology); id. at 82 (testimony of Elliott A. Norse, Director, Public Affairs
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the organism, its infectivity, and other possible undesirable byproducts. Next, an adequate risk assessment would apply some
sort of model to predict the dispersion of the organism or plant
into the environment and the potential human and environmental exposure to it. Finally, still more modelling might be necessary to relate exposure to predicted harm.
Because the early risk assessments will be highly speculative,
the agencies should undertake to characterize the attendant uncertainties. An agency could, for example, predict a "worst case"
scenario and compare it with a "best case" scenario and a "most
likely case" scenario. As the technology evolves and as more information becomes available from monitoring the technologies in
the environment, the uncertainties should diminish, and the
agency might be able to base regulatory decisions on generic predictions that certain classes of agricultural biotechnologies pose
negligible or excessive risks. 81
Once the decision has been made to allow the widespread use
of a genetically engineered plant or microorganism, the regulatory agency should retain the capacity to monitor for the presence of the organism in the environment to determine whether it
has unanticipated effects. Most likely, the amenability of a microorganism or plant to environmental monitoring will have to
be genetically engineered into it at the outset. 82 Hence, the
agency must have the authority to require the proponent of the
technology to install this susceptibility to monitoring into the
plant or microorganism.

C. Risk Management
When risk assessments suggest that particular agricultural
biotechnologies pose unacceptable risks, an adequate regulatory
Office, Ecological Soc'y of Am.); Planned Release Hearing, supra note 3, at 31 (testimony of Ronald Cape, Chairman of the Bd. & Chief Executive Officer, Cetus Corp.)
(favoring a case by case approach solely as an "interim necessity"); Harlow, supra note
39, at 555-56. But see Planned Release Hearing, supra note 3, at 91 (testimony of Robert M. Goodman, Vice President, Research & Dev., Calgene, Inc.) (arguing that a case by
case approach "would result in shallow and redundant studies rather than the coherent,
broadly based academic study that is called for").
81. See Coordinated Framework Hearing, supra note 3, at 71 (testimony of Monica
Riley, American Soc'y for Microbiology); Harlow, supra note 39, at 555-56.
82. Genetically engineering a microorganism to facilitate monitoring may itself cause
undesirable traits. For example, one of the most common techniques for facilitating
monitoring is to design antibiotic resistance into a bacterium. Obviously, this trait is of
concern in its own right, because it may impede efforts to destroy the organism. Mellon
Comments, supra note 37.
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regime must be capable of reducing or eliminating those risks. A
wide variety of regulatory approaches exists to address the risks
posed by dangerous technologies, ranging from outright bans to
positive economic incentives. The general options available for
the regulation of biotechnology have been addressed elsewhere,
and that analysis will not be repeated here. 83
There seems to be an evolving consensus in the regulatory
agencies, the regulated industry, and environmental groups that
the most appropriate regulatory control for large-scale release
biotechnology is a permit system designed to impose regulatory
requirements on a case by case basis. 8 " The permitting agency
can attach such conditions upon the manufacture, distribution,
and use of the technology as are necessary to render the risks
acceptable. Moreover, because genetically engineered microorganisms and plants can proliferate once released into the environment, it is probably appropriate to require a permit even before
small-scale testing of genetically engineered plants and microorganisms outside of greenhouses. There is a good deal of debate,
however, over whether the acceptability of the risk should be determined by explicit reference to the technology's benefits, or
whether it should be determined by broad reference to other
risks that society deems acceptable. 811
The permitting approach may have the significant disadvantage of "freezing" safety-oriented controls into standard categories. This inflexibility can hinder future development of potentially useful agricultural biotechnologies. "Performance"
standards, under which proponents of a technology need only
ensure that its uses do not violate broad indicia of health and
environmental harm, give the proponents of technologies greater
flexibility. But the risk assessment art is not currently sufficiently sophisticated to allow an agency to arrive at precise criteria for adequate performance. Even if the agency could somehow
arrive at an "acceptable" concentration of a microorganism or
plant in the general environment, it is not clear that current
monitoring technologies are capable of detecting them in the environment at "unacceptable" concentrations. A case by case permitting approach is probably necessary until scientists under83. See McGarity & Bayer, supra note 39, at 482-97.
84. See Coordinated Framework, supra note 63, at 23,309; McGarity & Bayer, supra
note 39, at 499-500. Under this approach, the regulatory agency would require the proponent of a particular agricultural biotechnology to obtain a permit upon a showing that
the risks of its use were not unacceptable.
85. See generally M. DOUGLAS & A. WILDAVSKY, R1sK AND CULTURE (1982); L. LAVE,
THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL REGULATION (1981); W. LOWRANCE, OF ACCEPTABLE RISK (1976).
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D. Public Participation
Given the controversial history of biotechnology in the laboratory,86 any regulatory decisions that result in a deliberate release
of genetically engineered plants or microorganisms into the environment should be made only with the broadest possible public
participation. Opponents of agricultural biotechnologies can easily conjure up visions of pandemics and ecological catastrophes,
and such images have played no small role in past debates over
the use of recombinant DNA techniques in academic laboratories.87 The not so distant memories of attempts to dismantle the
EPA and other health and environmental agencies during the
early 1980's suggest that we are not at a high point in public
trust in regulatory agencies. 88 To some extent, the crippling of
the nuclear power industry after Three Mile Island is attributable to a lack of public confidence in the decisions of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. 89 To avoid a similar distrust of regulators of agricultural biotechnology, representatives of the public
must be given a direct role in the regulatory decisions.
Public participation can be burdensome to regulatory agencies, and it can delay regulatory decisionmaking. If the technology develops uneventfully, public attention will no doubt wane
and delays will not plague the process. But at least initially, the
relevant regulatory agencies must make affirmative efforts to ensure that public interest groups and individual members of the
public are informed well in advance of important decisions and
are given sufficient time and opportunity to make their views
known. If significant segments of the public are convinced that
the regulatory process is closed to them, the technology may not
survive in this highly pluralistic society, however vast its potential long-run benefits.
86. N. WADE, supra note 1; Swazey, Sorenson & Wong, Risks and Benefits, Rights
and Responsibilities: A History of the Recombinant DNA Research Controversy, 51 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1019 (1978).
87. See M. ROGERS, supra note 1; N. WADE, supra note 1.
88. See J. CLAYBROOK, RETREAT FROM SAFETY (1984); J. LASH, K. GILLMAN & D. SHERIDAN, A SEASON OF SPOILS (1984); S. TOLCHIN & M. TOLCHIN, DISMANTLING AMERICA (1983).
89. See J. TOMAIN, NUCLEAR POWER TRANSFORMATION (1987).
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ADEQUACY OF EXISTING REGULATORY AUTHORITIES

Having identified some important elements of an adequate
regulatory regime for agricultural biotechnology, we shall now
examine the existing statutory authorities to determine the extent to which they provide sufficient authority to implement an
adequate regulatory program. At the same time, we shall examine the proposed regulatory programs for agricultural biotechnology and ask whether the USDA and the EPA are likely
to have the resources and, more importantly, the institutional
willingness to implement an effective regulatory program.
Most of the relevant statutes address particular uses of technologies or particular adverse end points. For example, the
FIFRA90 provides authority to regulate substances intended to
mitigate pests, but vests no authority in the EPA to regulate the
very same substances if they are not intended for pest control.
Similarly, the Virus-Serum-Toxin Act (VSTA) 91 applies only to
biologics and microorganisms intended for use in the treatment
of domestic animals. The Act of February 2, 1903,92 and the
Federal Plant Pest Act93 give the USDA somewhat broader authority to regulate microorganisms, plants, and other organisms
that cause animal and plant diseases, or otherwise directly or
indirectly damage or injure plants. It would be surprising if this
patchwork of statutes, without the protective umbrella of a gapfilling statute like the TSCA, 94 provided adequate authority to
protect the environment from all of the risks of agricultural biotechnologies. Therefore, we should not be surprised to discover
that when measured against the aforementioned elements of an
adequate regulatory regime, there are several significant gaps
that must be filled by the TSCA. 911 Unfortunately, we shall also
discover that the TSCA itself applies only ambiguously to agricultural biotechnologies, and even under the EPA's fairly ambitious interpretation of that Act, some elements of an adequate
regulatory regime are still missing.
90. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
91. 21 U.S.C. §§ 151-158 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
92. Id. § 111 (1982).
93. 7 u.s.c. §§ 150-150jj (1982).
94. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
95. Of course, any existing statutory gaps need not be filled at all, if the policymaker
believes that the risks posed by agricultural biotechnologies do not warrant a complete
regulatory regime. For reasons identified in Part 1(8) supra, however, the public will
probably not knowingly accept an incomplete regulatory process for these new
technologies.
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Prerelease Notification

1. Genetically engineered microorganisms- The current
statutory authorities for regulating genetically engineered microorganisms vary somewhat from those that address genetically
engineered plants. In addition, the risks posed by microorganisms may not be the same as those posed by plants. The following analysis will therefore distinguish between microorganisms
and plants.
a. Pesticides- The FIFRA provides that a pesticide may
not be sold, distributed, or received by any person unless the
pesticide is registered with the EPA. 96 The EPA would necessarily be informed of any lawful uses of genetically engineered microorganisms that were intended to kill or mitigate pests. Even
experimental uses of potential pesticides must have a permit
from the EPA. 97 For example, the EPA has recently issued an
experimental use permit for a genetically engineered organism
intended to replace a bacterium that facilitates frost
formation. 98
96. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (1982).
97. Id. § 136a(b)(2). The EPA may issue an experimental use permit allowing a potential registrant to gather data sufficient to obtain a full registration. Id. § 136c (Supp.
IV 1986). In theory, the EPA must be made aware of all experimental uses. The Agency,
however, has in the past exempted uses of unregistered pesticides on less than 10 acres
from the experimental use permit requirement. 40 C.F.R. § 172.3 (1987). Nevertheless,
in light of the novelty of genetic engineering, the EPA has decided to make the exemption inapplicable to microorganisms deliberately formed to contain genetic material from
dissimilar source organisms and microorganisms containing genetic material from a similar source if any source organism is a pathogen. With one exception (for combinations in
which the genetic material added to the recipient microorganism consists only of wellcharacterized, non-coding regulatory regions), such organisms will be subject to EPA review prior to any release pursuant to an experimental use permit. A "well-characterized,
non-coding regulatory region" is a region on the DNA molecule that has been studied in
sufficient detail so that it is known with a high degree of certainty that the region does
not code for the production of a protein, peptide, or functional RNA molecules. See U.S.
Envtl. Protection Agency, Statement of Policy; Microbial Products Subject to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act and the Toxic Substances Control Act,
51 Fed. Reg. 23,313, 23,332 (1986) [hereinafter EPA Policy Statement]. All other genetically engineered pesticides will be subject to an abbreviated review prior to the issuance
of an experimental use permit. Nonengineered microorganisms that are not pathogens
and that are not indigenous will likewise be subject to abbreviated review. Only indigenous nonengineered nonpathogens may be released without any review at all. Id. at
23,316. Depending upon the quality of the review, this approach may be sufficiently protective. But see infra text accompanying notes 130-31 (criticizing the exemption for intergeneric transfers of well-characterized, non-coding regulatory regions).
98. See Foundation on Economic Trends v. Thomas, 637 F. Supp. 25 (D.D.C. 1986);
ISSUES IN FEDERAL REGULATION REPORT, supra note 3, at 29-36.
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b. Veterinary biological products- Under the VSTA as
amended by the Food Security Act of 1985,99 the USDA has established a permit program for all viruses, serums, and toxins
intended for use in the treatment of domestic animals. 100 A person may not import, distribute, or ship such "veterinary biologics" unless produced in a licensed establishment under a
USDA product license. To obtain a license, the USDA must be
satisfied that the product is safe for the treated animals,
humans, and the environment. Thus, the USDA should obtain
prerelease notification of all commercial uses of veterinary
biologics.
The USDA has recently proposed regulations providing for
prerelease notice of experimental releases of potential veterinary
biologics as well. The USDA's current regulations prohibit the
unauthorized use of "experimental biological products" 101 in facilities that are licensed for the production of biological products,102 and they prohibit the interstate shipment of experimental products without authorization, 103 but they do not currently
regulate the experimental use of a potential product in a laboratory that is not a facility licensed to produce biologics. 10" The
Department's recently proposed rules prohibit intrastate shipment of any unlicensed biological product for experimental use
in animals, except that the USDA may authorize such shipments
for testing in a limited number of animals. 106
Although old veterinary biologics must generally be prepared
in a licensed facility, the recent amendments to the. VSTA,
which gave the USDA authority over intrastate shipment, also
provide that the Department shall by regulation exempt from
the licensing requirement biologics prepared by a person or cor99. Pub. L. No. 99-198, § 1404, 99 Stat. 1544 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 3121 (Supp. IV
1986)).
100. The USDA's current regulations, 9 C.F.R §§ 101-123 (1987), apply only to veterinary biologics that are intended for import or use in interstate commerce, but the Food
Security Act of 1985 amended the Virus-Serum-Toxin Act to give it authority over veterinary biologics intended for use in intrastate commerce. The USDA has recently announced its intention to amend its regulations to reflect this new authority. Final Policy
Statement for Research and Regulation of Biotechnology Processes and Products, 51
Fed. Reg. 23,339 (1986).
101. The term "experimental biological product" is defined as "a biological product
which is being evaluated to substantiate an application for a product license or permit."
9 C.F.R. § 101.3(b) (1987).
102. Id. § 103.1.
103. Id. § 103.3.
104. Telephone interview with David Espeseth, Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service, USDA (Feb. 19, 1987) [hereinafter Espeseth Interview].
105. 51 Fed. Reg. 41,975, 41,977 (1986) (proposed amendments to 7 C.F.R. § 103.3).
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poration: (1) solely for administration to animals of that person
or companies, (2) solely for administration to animals by a licensed veterinarian, or (3) solely for distribution pursuant to an
approved state licensing program. The regulations still prevent
the shipment of any worthless, contaminated, dangerous, or
harmful product, and producers of products containing live organisms must still provide any information the Department may
require to assess the product's safety and effects on the environment.106 But the Department would not necessarily receive notice of shipments of exempted products in intrastate commerce.
Clearly, the first two exemptions leave a potentially large gap
in the USDA's notice requirements. The USDA would not necessarily receive notice of the preparation and shipment of an unlicensed veterinary biological by a company for experiments in its
own animals; nor would it receive notice of an unapproved shipment and use by a licensed veterinarian as part of a treatment
for a diseased animal. These exemptions may well undermine
the otherwise applicable notice requirement for intrastate shipment of genetically engineered biologicals for experimental purposes. Because the USDA has not promulgated implementing
regulations for the first (and potentially most important) exemption, it remains to be seen whether the prerelease notice aspect
of the regulatory regime for veterinary biologicals is adequate.
Finally, there has been some ambiguity in the USDA's approach
to testing veterinary biologics in animals outside the confines of
a laboratory. Early statements by responsible officials indicated
that the agency did not regard testing in an animal to be a "release" of a genetically engineered microorganism into the environment, even if the animal was not within an enclosed building.107 The Department's recently proposed regulations for
experimental uses of animal biologics 108 and more recent statements of agency officials, 109 however, indicate that the agency
will receive notice and have an opportunity to disapprove of any
unexempted shipment of animal biologics for experimental
purposes.
c. Animal diseases- Under the Act of February 2, 1903, and
the VST A, the USDA has established a permit regime for the
import and interstate transport of all organisms that "may introduce or disseminate any contagious or infectious disease of
106. Id. at 41,975, 41,978 (proposed amendments to 9 C.F.R. § 107.1).
107. Coordinated Framework Hearing, supra note 3, at 267-68; A. Carr, supra note
56, at 13.
108. 51 Fed. Reg. 41,975 (1986).
109. Espeseth Comments, supra note 10.
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animals (including poultry)." 110 Although this requirement could
ensure that the USDA is made aware of all imports and interstate transports of genetically engineered microorganisms, three
aspects of the permit program cast considerable doubt on its
adequacy.
First, the permit requirement as written only applies to interstate transport of genetically engineered microorganisms or vectors of such microorganisms. The Department's authority under
the Act of February 2, 1903 extends only to interstate commerce.
Although the Department's authority under the Virus-SerumToxin Act has been extended to intrastate commerce, it is unclear whether that statute applies to organisms that are not intended to cure diseases in animals. Even if that statute could be
read so broadly, the agency has not amended its regulations to
require permits for intrastate transport of microorganisms that
might cause animal diseases. Thus, for example, the USDA
would not necessarily become aware of inoculations of cattle
with a genetically engineered microorganism derived from some
deadly human or animal virus, as long as the responsible person
did not propose to take the microorganism across state lines.
Second, the permit requirement is limited to organisms that
"may" cause animal diseases, and this important threshold finding may be difficult to make in the abstract. Apparently, no
prerelease testing is required to determine whether an organism
"may" cause an animal disease and therefore be subject to regulation. The Department has not attempted to assemble a list of
animal pathogens as it has proposed for plant pests;m rather, it
tends to focus exclusively upon particular diseases for which
Congress has established quarantine programs. 112 The USDA
would generally not be aware of the creation of a novel organism
that could cause animal diseases, unless informed by the
manufacturer. 113
Third, the permit requirement is only tangentially relevant to
microorganisms that may be dangerous to wildlife. A permit
would probably not be required for a microorganism that caused
an infectious disease only in reptiles. The regulations by their
110. 9 C.F.R. § 122.l(e) (1987).
111. See infra text accompanying notes 119-22.
112. Telephone interview with William Ketter, Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service, USDA (Feb. 26, 1987) [hereinafter Ketter Interview]. These official programs
typically are created at the behest of the affected industry. The USDA devotes the bulk
of its attention to writing permits for the import of animals that might be diseased. Id.
113. Id.
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terms apply to diseases of all "animals (including poultry)," 11 •
but the program's primary focus is clearly upon commercially
valuable species.
d. Plant pests- Under the FPPA, 1111 the USDA has established a permit regime for microorganisms, plants, and other organisms that "can directly or indirectly injure or cause disease
or damage in any plants or parts thereof. " 116 Such organisms
cannot be imported into or transported in the United States
without a permit. 117 The Department may refuse to issue a permit when "such movement would involve a danger of dissemination" of plant pests. 118
As part of the Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, the USDA has promulgated regulations governing
manufacturers and importers of genetically engineered microorganisms that may be plant pests. 119 The USDA has defined "regulated article" to include
[a]ny organism which has been altered or produced
through genetic engineering, if the donor organism, recipient organism, or vector, or vector agent belongs to any
genera or taxa designated in [a long list of designated organisms] and meets the definition of plant pest, or is an
unclassified organism and/or an organism whose classification is unknown, or any product which contains such
an organism, or any other organism or product altered or
produced through genetic engineering which the Deputy
Administrator determines is a plant pest or has reason to
believe is a plant pest. 120
114.

9 C.F.R. § 122.l(e) (1987).

115.

7 U.S.C. § 150aa-150jj (1982).

116.

Id. § 150aa(c).

117.

Id. § 150bb(a).

118.

Id. § 150bb(b).

119. Introduction of Organisms and Products Altered or Produced Through Genetic
Engineering Which are Plant Pests or Which There is Reason to Believe are Plant Pests,
52 Fed. Reg. 22,892 (1987) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pts. 330, 340) [hereinafter Introduction of Organisms].
120. Id. at 22,908. The definition explicitly excludes "recipient microorganisms which
are not plant pests and which have resulted from the addition of genetic material from a
donor organism where the material is well characterized and contains only non-coding
regulatory regions." Id.
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The list includes a large proportion of agriculturally oriented
hosts and vectors. 121 A permit is required before "regulated articles" may be released into the environment. 122
The quoted definition of "regulated article" represents a significant retrenchment from the definition that the USDA originally proposed in 1986. 123 Under the proposed definition, a genetically engineered organism or product would be a "regulated
article" if the host or vector was on the list. The Agency assumed that such organisms and products "can directly or indirectly injure" plants. This broad, but quite reasonable, interpretation of the words "can directly or indirectly injure" would
have included organisms that have not caused any harm in the
past but that could injure crops in the future. 124 The USDA thus
proposed a generic rule identifying a broad class of genetically
engineered microorganisms that could injure plants in the future
if appropriate conditions were not placed on their movement
through the permit process.
The legislative history of the FPP A indicates that Congress
did not mean to require a high degree of certainty before empowering the USDA to protect plants. The House Report
stressed the need to supplement existing quarantine statutes,
because they did not "provide authority to regulate the movement into or through the United States of insects that might
later be found to be injurious to cultivated crops. " 1211 It is, therefore, unlikely that a court would have overturned the USDA's
cautiously broad reading of its own statute. At least one company apparently acquiesced in the USDA's authority to require
prerelease notice of genetically engineered organisms that are on
its plant pest list, 126 and the Industrial Biotechnology Associa121. Medley Interview, supra note 53. For example, most researchers use a plasmid
from a listed organism to transfer genes to agriculturally related microorganisms in their
recombinant DNA research. Id. In addition, the "reason to believe" catchall phrase is
meant to encompass a broad variety of potentially harmful activities based on scientific
information, such as biological data and toxonomic association. Id.
122. Id. The term "release into the environment" is defined very broadly to include
"(t]he use of a regulated article outside the constraints of physical confinement that are
found in a laboratory, contained greenhouse, or a fermenter or other contained structure." Introduction of Organisms, supra note 119, at 22,908-09.
123. Introduction of Organisms, supra note 119, at 22,896.
124 The USDA has adopted this broader reading in the past to require permits for
microorganisms that might cause damage, even when they have not been proven to do so.
See Coordinated Framework Hearing, supra note 3, at 145 (testimony of Karen Darling,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Mktg. & Inspection Servs., USDA).
125. H.R. REP. No. 289, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1957).
126. A company has requested a permit to field-test a genetically engineered microorganism that may have an enhanced capacity to fix nitrogen for legumes. Crawford, supra
note 7, at 840; EPA Fact Sheet, supra note 7.
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tion suggested that "only an obtuse interpretation of the
[FPPA] could lead one to conclude that USDA does not have
the authority to determine whether a novel organism is a plant
pest."121
Nevertheless, many companies objected that the USDA could
not presume that a genetically engineered organism or product
might be a plant pest simply because the host or vector came
from the list. In their view, the USDA could not require a permit absent an independent determination that the organism or
product met the statutory definition of plant pest. The USDA
acquiesced in this narrower view of its authority, and in the final
rule, it defined "regulated article" to include only organisms and
products containing listed hosts and vectors that also met the
statutory definition of "plant pest."
Although it is certainly true that the USDA has no authority
under the FPP A to regulate organisms and products that do not
meet the statutory definition of "plant pest," its proposed generic approach was a sensible and lawful tool for implementing
the "can directly or indirectly injure" test of the statutory definition. The narrower definition of "regulated article" in the final
regulations begs the critical question of who makes the independent "plant pest" determination. Because the USDA has no way
of knowing whether a novel organism has been created until a
permit has been requested, it is apparent that in virtually all
cases, the creator of the new organism will be responsible for
making the "plant pest" determination. And because the USDA
has no authority to require testing for adverse health or environmental effects until someone has applied for a permit, the creator is apparently free to make the independent "plant pest" determination based on whatever data it deems appropriate. The
long list of hosts and vectors is thus merely a guideline to manufacturers of genetically engineered organisms and products. The
net result is that the USDA cannot be certain that it will receive
prerelease notice of all genetically engineered organisms and
products that might harm plants. As a practical matter, the
USDA may discover the existence of a genetically engineered
plant pest onl);' after it has caused damage. 128
127. Coordinated Framework Hearing, supra note 3, at 163.
128. Another substantive weakness of the notification system is a relatively important exemption for "non-pathogenic" organisms that have resulted from the addition of
genetic material that is "well characterized" and contains only "non-coding regulatory
regions." Introduction of Organisms, supra note 119, at 22,908. This exemption appears
to apply to such well-known hosts as Bacillus subtilis and some forms of Escherichia coli,
two workhorses of recombinant DNA biotechnology. The Department would not necessa-
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It should be noted, however, that the final rule does not necessarily leave a gap in authority to provide prerelease notification.
To the extent that the USDA does not receive notification, the
EPA should receive a premanufacture notification under the
TSCA. 129 Hence, by narrowing its own jurisdiction, the USDA
has simply broadened the EPA's jurisdiction. To the extent that
the EPA has the scientific expertise to evaluate the potential of
genetically engineered organisms and products to harm plants
and to the extent that manufacturers who determine that their
organisms and products do not meet the "plant pest" definition
understand that they must still give prerelease notification to
the EPA, this may be acceptable. Whether one applauds or condemns the USDA's final rule, therefore, depends upon one's
faith in the relative abilities of the USDA and the EPA to protect the environment without unduly inhibiting new
technologies.
e. Other uses- Genetically engineered microorganisms that
would- not be regulated under any of the foregoing authorities
may be subject to regulation under the TSCA, which provides
for premanufacture notification to the EPA of all new "chemical
substances.m 3 o The EPA has taken the position that microorganisms, other than those specifically exempted by statute, 131 are
chemical substances. 132 This author has argued elsewhere that
although the DNA within microorganisms can reasonably be
characterized as a chemical substance, the EPA may be going
too far in calling the entire microorganism a chemical substance. 133 In any event, the EP A's position is subject to legal
rily be made aware of the introduction of exempted organisms, unless the responsible
person applied for a courtesy permit pursuant to the proposed regulations. Id. at 22,913.
For a critique of the same exemption under the TSCA, see infra text accompanying
notes 130-31.
129. See infra text accompanying notes 130-52. There is, however, a potential gap if
manufacturers look only to the USDA list and do not realize that even if they do not
employ hosts and vectors on the list, they are still subject to TSCA premanufacture
notification.
130. 15 U.S.C. § 2604 (1982). A chemical substance is a ."new" chemical substance if
it is not on the inventory of chemical substances that the EPA has compiled under
§ 8(b) of the Act. Id. § 2607(b).
131. The statute exempts from the definition of "chemical substance" substances
that are manufactured, processed, or distributed for use as pesticides, foods, food additives, drugs, cosmetics, and medical devices. Id. § 2602(2)(B)(ii), (vi). The intent here
was clearly to prevent overlap with the FIFRA and the FDA's regulatory authorities.
132. EPA Policy Statement, supra note 97, at 23,324.
133. McGarity & Bayer, supra note 39, at 506; see also Coordinated Framework
Hearing, supra note 3, at 66 (testimony of Monica Riley, American Soc'y for Microbiology) (describing the EPA's interpretation as "strained").
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challenge. m Perhaps out of concern for what might replace the
current regulatory regime if the TCSA were held to be inapplicable to genetically engineered microorganisms, the biotechnology industry has not objected to the EP A's expansive reading of
its statute.
The EPA has adopted a system for prerelease notification
under the TSCA that mirrors the system that it has adopted
under the FIFRA. The EPA will require prerelease notification
for all microorganisms resulting from intentional, intergeneric
combinations of genetic material, except those in which the
transferred material is only a well-characterized, non-coding regulatory region. Microorganisms resulting from intrageneric combinations of genetic material are not considered to be "new"
chemical substances and are, therefore, not subject to the statute's premanufacture notification requirements.
The EPA's rationale for these distinctions does not coincide
well with the statutory language, but one of the exemptions may
be compelled by practical necessity. A "new" chemical substance
is defined by statute to be a substance that is not on the inventory of existing substances that the EPA compiled pursuant to
section 2607(b) of the TSCA. 1311 The EPA has included on this
inventory a generic category of all "unprocessed," naturally occurring substances. 136 "Naturally occurring" organisms are those
that "(1) exist as a result of natural events or processes, or (2)
have been developed as a result of limited manipulation of natural processes." 137 Hence, the EPA has historically taken the position that the products of traditional breeding techniques are not
"new chemical substances," even though the DNA may never
have existed before as a chemical substance. The Agency has extended this logic to conclude that the products of intrageneric
gene transfers accomplished through modern biotechnologies are
not "new" chemical substances. The rationale for this position is
largely administrative practicality-the Agency might otherwise
be overwhelmed with premanufacture notices for relatively trivial transfers that pose no known risks to humans or to the environment. The Agency believes that such microorganisms have a
very low probability of exhibiting new combinations of traits. 138
134. McGarity & Bayer, supra note 39, at 506.
135. 15 u.s.c. § 2602(9) (1982).
136. 40 C.F.R. § 710.4(b)(l)(i) (1987).
137. Environmental Protection Agency, Proposed Policy Regarding Certain Microbial
Products, 49 Fed. Reg. 50,880, 50,888 (1984) [hereinafter Microbial Products].
138. EPA Policy Statement, supra note 97, at 23,317-18.
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The Agency does, however, have plans to deal with intrageneric transfers of genetic material when the host organism
is a pathogen or the transferred material is from a pathogen.
Even though the EPA has concluded that such an organism
would not be a new chemical substance, it plans to issue a "significant new use rule" under section 5(a)(2) 139 that would require the manufacturer to make the EPA aware of any planned
releases, even in small field tests, except to the extent that the
microorganism would already be subject to USDA review as a
plant pest or animal pathogen. 140 This accommodation should
adequately address the most dangerous of the products of intrageneric transfers.
The EP A's exclusion of microorganisms resulting from intergeneric combinations in which the transferred material is only a
well-characterized, non-coding, regulatory region is less comprehensible.141 Having concluded that it would be administratively
feasible to include most intergeneric combinations, it is not
likely that the excluded combinations would substantially ease
the administrative burden. The Agency argues that such transfers present a "special case," because "[w]here only regulatory
material is transferred, no distinctly new combinations of traits
are introduced; instead, existing traits in the receiving microorganisms are amplified or changed quantitatively." 142 For this
reason, the EPA concludes that the microorganisms are not new,
even though they contain DNA from an entirely different genus.
This explanation is entirely unconvincing. Amplifying existing
traits can have a very large impact on the characteristics of an
organism from the standpoint of the receiving environment. For
example, a microorganism may secrete a material that is toxic to
seeds only during the first six hours of its existence, when it is
not likely to come into contact with seeds. Transferring regulatory material that makes the organism synthesize the material
throughout its lifetime might cause economic and environmental
damage if the organism did come into contact with seeds later in
its life cycle. In addition, an organism can be quite "novel," even
though it is the product of an intrageneric transfer of only a
well-characterized, non-coding, regulatory region:
139. 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a)(2) (1982).
140. EPA Policy Statement, supra note 97, at 23,328-29.
141. The following critique applies equally to the same exemption under the FIFRA,
supra note 97, and the FPPA, supra note 128.
142. EPA Policy Statement, supra note 97, at 23,325-26.
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The major concern about engineered organisms is their
novelty. The manipulation of regulatory elements-start
and stop signals and modulators of the rate at which
genes are synthesized-could conceivably introduce a significant degree of novelty that is independent of dissimilarity of gene products or pathogenicity. Even though the
genetic engineer in such circumstances is confined to the
same set of structural genes, he can use the regulatory
elements to turn those genes on and off in different sequences, and to produce gene products in different
amounts and in combinations with other gene products.
The result could be an organism with a high degree of
novelty. 143
The EPA has also taken steps to demand prerelease notification of experimental uses of genetically engineered microorganisms, despite statutory restrictions on its ability to intrude into
research and development activities. Section 5(h)(3) of the
TSCA exempts from the premanufacture notification requirements manufacturing and processing chemical substances "in
small quantities (as defined by the Administrator by rule)"
solely for the purpose of scientific experimentation or research
and development. The EPA has proposed to avoid this limitation by determining that no small-scale release of a genetically
engineered microorganism for experimental purposes would be a
release of a "small quantity," because microorganisms can proliferate in the environment. 144
A more difficult hurdle is the fact that the premanufacture notification requirements apply only to manufacturing or processing substances for "commercial purposes."145 Purely academic
experimentation with no commercial purpose is exempt. Although any academic research sponsored by the federal government would be subject to the NIH guidelines, 146 deliberate releases into the environment in connection with privately ·
sponsored academic research apparently could proceed without
the EPA's knowledge. This is a potential gap in coverage,1" the
143. Coordinated Framework Hearing, supra note 3, at 53 (testimony of Margaret
Mellon, Director, Toxic Substances Program, Environmental Law Inst.).
144. EPA Policy Statement, supra note 97, at 23,330.
145. See 15 U.S.C. § 2604(i) (1982).
146. National Insts. of Health, Recombinant DNA Research: Proposed Revised
Guidelines, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,368 (1981); see supra note 57.
147. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., Comments on Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology 22 (Apr. 15, 1985) [hereinafter
NRDC Comments].
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significance of which depends upon the extent to which academic researchers plan deliberate releases in the future. 148
The EPA has attempted to avoid overlapping regulatory requirements by exempting from TSCA review genetically engineered microorganisms that will be adequately reviewed by the
USDA. 149 Thus, microorganisms intended solely for use as
animal biologics and those subject to the FPPA's permit requirements would be exclusively regulated by the USDA. The
EPA does plan to use the TSCA as a gap-filling authority, and
to the extent that no other agency claims authority over genetically engineered microorganisms, the manufacturer may have to
file a premanufacture notice with the EP A. 1110 To be on the safe
side, it would probably be desirable at first for manufacturers to
file notices with both the EPA and the USDA. 1111 The EPA and
the USDA plan to meet frequently to address questions of overlapping authority. 1112
2. Genetically engineered plants- The regulatory regime
currently in place for plants that might pose risks to the environment is not extensive. On its face, it is limited to plants that
are plant pests or noxious weeds. Whether these two categories
encompass all genetically engineered plants that might pose environmental risks is debatable.
a. Plant pests and noxious weeds- As we have seen, the
FPP A establishes a permitting regime for "plant pests." That
term is defined to include, inter alia, "bacteria, fungi, other parasitic plants or reproductive parts thereof . . . or any organisms
similar to or allied with any of the foregoing ... which can directly or indirectly injure or cause disease or damage in any
plants or parts thereof." 163 The Noxious Weed Act 164 also establishes a permit system for the movement of "noxious weeds,"
which are defined to include:
148. For example, universities often establish privately sponsored research "institutes" that might well come within this gap in coverage, because the research would not
necessarily be in pursuit of any particular commercialization plan. See M. KENNEY, BIOTECHNOLOGY 42-54 (1986).
149. EPA Policy Statement, supra note 97, at 23,317.
150. See id. at 23,318; Medley Interview, supra note 53.
151. In a recent case, the manufacturer of the genetically engineered bacterium with
enhanced nitrogen fixing capabilities filed both a premanufacture notice with the EPA
and a request for a Plant Pest Act permit with the USDA. Crawford, supra note 7, at
840; see EPA Fact Sheet, supra note 7. See generally IssuEs IN FEDERAL REGULATION
REPORT, supra note 3, at 79 (describing overlapping authority).
152. Medley Interview, supra note 53.
153. 7 U.S.C. § 150aa(c) (1982) (emphasis added).
154. Id. §§ 2801-2813.
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any living stage . . . of any parasitic or other plant of a
kind, or subdivision of a kind, which is of foreign origin,
is new to or not widely prevalent in the United States,
and can directly or indirectly injure crops, other useful
plants, livestock, or poultry or other interests of agriculture ... or the fish and wildlife resources of the United
States or the public health. uui
As we have seen, the USDA's regulatory regime under the
FPPA would put the USDA on notice of any movement of "regulated articles" for commercial or experimental purposes. 1116 The
USDA's recent regulations define "regulated article" to include
listed plants that have been genetically engineered, and any
plants that have been genetically engineered through the use of
a listed vector or that contain genes from a listed plant or microorganism, as long as they independently meet the statutory definition of "plant pest." Because the listed vectors include virtually all of the vectors that are currently used in recombinant
DNA biotechnologies, this very broad definition of "regulated
article" potentially includes most genetically engineered
plants. 1117
A large measure of the breadth of the definition of "regulated
article," insofar as it applies to plants, is due to the inclusion of
listed vectors. If other technologies for inserting foreign DNA
into plant cells, such as micropipetting, become available, genetically engineered plants that are not listed and do not receive
DNA from listed organisms may not come within the definition
of "regulated article," and they will fall outside of the USDA's
notice requirement.
More importantly, the definition of "plant pest" in the FPPA
is limited to "parasitic plants" or other organisms similar to or
allied with parasitic plants. The only reference to plants that are
plant pests in the statute is a reference to parasitic plants. The
USDA has tacitly acknowledged this limitation in its list of potential plant pests, which contains only parasitic plants. A manufacturer of a genetically engineered plant, who under the final
regulation must make an independent "plant pest" determina155. Id. § 2802(c).
156. See supra text accompanying notes 115-17.
157. Comments of Michael Lidsky, Regulatory Specialist, Biotechnology and Environmental Coordination Staff, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA (Apr.
22, 1987) (commenting on an earlier draft of this Article) [hereinafter Lidsky Comments]; Comments of Edward Raleigh, Manager, Biotechnology Regulatory Affairs, E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co. (Apr. 6, 1987) (commenting on an earlier draft of this Article)
[hereinafter Raleigh Comments].

SUMMER

1987]

Agricultural Biotechnology

1123

tion, could make a very persuasive case for the proposition that
genetically engineered plants that are not parasites are not plant
pests. 168
The Noxious Weed Act establishes a similar regulatory regime
for the importation and interstate transport of noxious weeds,
but it requires the Department to promulgate a list of noxious
weeds for which permits are required. There must be an opportunity for a public hearing before a plant is added to the list,
and a plant may not be added unless the Department determines that the plant meets the definition of noxious weed and
"that its dissemination in the United States may reasonably be
expected to have, to a serious degree, any effect specified in [the
definition of 'noxious weed']." 169 This latter limitation, which is
contained in another section of the statute, may have the practical effect of precluding the Department from establishing a
broad precatory permit system for nonparasitic plants that may
cause damage to crops or wildlife. 160 The Department has not
attempted to erect a regulatory program under its Noxious
Weed Act authority for genetically engineered plants. 161 Acknowledging that it does not generally act to stop the spread of
a noxious weed until the weed has done some economic damage,
the Department has not stressed the Noxious Weed Act in
describing its statutory authority. 162
Absent any comprehensive permitting process, it seems clear
that the Department will not receive prerelease notification of
all genetically engineered plants; nor will it even -receive prerelease notice of all genetically engineered plants that may turn
out to be plant pests or noxious weeds. 163 The regulatory regime
158. The USDA could perhaps argue that genetically engineered nonparasitic plants
might come within the definition of "plant pest" because they are "similar to or allied
with" parasitic plants. This argument is only plausible if there is some factual basis for
concluding that genetically engineering a nonparasitic plant through a listed vector or by
inserting DNA from a listed organism may turn the nonparasitic plant into a plant similar to or allied with a parasitic plant. The author is unaware of any factual information
(or even reasoned speculation) that would support such an inference.
159. 7 u.s.c. § 2809 (1982).
160. See NRDC Comments, supra note 147, at 26.
161. The USDA has received and approved one application for a permit to release a
genetically engineered tobacco plant into the environment for experimental purposes.
GAO USDA REPORT, supra note 4, at 38. Because the tobacco plant was not likely to be
a plant pest, the USDA issued an opinion letter under the FPPA indicating that fieldtesting the plant would not cause the introduction or dissemination of plant pests.
162. See Coordinated Framework Hearing, supra note 3, at 149 (testimony of Karen
Darling, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Mktg. & Inspection Servs., USDA).
163. See Planned Release Hearing, supra note 3, at 177-79 (colloquy between Rep.
Volkmer and John Patrick Jordan, Adminstrator, Cooperative State Research Serv.,
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is, therefore, inadequate for this purpose. 164 Whether the potential risks of genetically engineered plants, which in the opinion
of most experts are not as high as the risks of genetically engineered microorganisms, warrant a more thorough notice requirement is a matter for congressional attention.
b. Applicability of the TSCA to plants- The EPA has apparently recognized that it would have to stretch the words
"chemical substance" beyond recognition to apply the TSCA to
genetically engineered plants. 1611 Hence, the EPA cannot provide
the gap-filling role for genetically engineered plants that it proposes to play for genetically engineered microorganisms. Any
gaps in the USDA's authorities are likely to be gaps in all regulatory authority.

B. Data Collection, Data Evaluation, and Risk Assessment
1. Genetically engineered microorganisms- Once again, it
is appropriate to distinguish between genetically engineered microorganisms and genetically engineered plants in evaluating the
adequacy of existing authorities for collecting and evaluating
data and assessing risks.
a. Pesticides- To obtain a pesticide registration, the potential registrant must supply extensive information to the EPA on
the pesticide's identity, its environmental fate, its potential toxicity to humans and other animals, and its potential for ecological disruption. 166 Although the state of the risk assessment art
for genetically engineered microorganisms is still too primitive
to know definitively if the tests that the EPA requires will provide adequate data, they are a satisfactory starting point, and
they should serve as a guide to other agencies.
The foregoing registration requirements do not apply to experimental uses of pesticides. Because even small-scale experimental uses of genetically engineered microorganisms might result in the proliferation of pathogenic organisms, however, a
rudimentary risk assessment may be necessary before experimental uses are allowed. The Agency's statute provides for "exUSDA, in which Dr. Jordan admits that the USDA will not receive prerelease notification of all genetically engineered plants).
164. See NRDC Comments, supra note 147, at 26.
165. EPA Policy Statement, supra note 97, at 23,324.
166. The EPA has promulgated requirements for testing microbial pesticides, and
these are constantly being reexamined to meet changing needs. 40 C.F.R. §§ 158.165,
158.170, 162.163 (1987).

SUMMER

1987]

Agricultural Biotechnology

1125

perimental use permits" for this limited purpose. 167 Although
the Agency has in the past exempted from the experimental use
permit requirements applications of a pesticide to less than ten
acres of land or one acre of water, 168 the Agency has determined
that genetically engineered microorganisms should not have a
complete exemption, even for such limited applications. The
EPA has therefore decided to require potential registrants to
submit at least some information prior to any experimental use
of genetically engineered pesticides. 169 The Agency has, however,
distinguished between one class of pesticides that the Agency
believes warrants particularly close attention and all other genetically engineered pesticides.
Pesticides formed by deliberately combining genetic material
from organisms of different genera, and genetically engineered
pesticides derived from source organisms that are pathogens,
must undergo so-called "Level 11" review before the EPA decides whether to require an experimental use permit for smallscale releases. Level II review requires the submission of fairly
extensive information on the identity of the microorganism, its
genetic composition, the survivability of the host organism, its
potential for genetic exchange with wild microorganisms, its pesticidal activity, the location of the test, and the differences between the test site and the natural habitat of the host organism.170 Although it is difficult to tell whether the information
that the EPA requires is sufficient for a preliminary determination of risk, it is an important first step.
All other genetically engineered pesticides must undergo only
"Level I" review, which requires much less extensive information, prior to small-scale field testing. The EPA has only thirty
days to review a Level I application. If it makes no objection
within that time period, small-scale experimental use is permitted. The EPA has determined that genetically engineered microorganisms that do not involve the exchange of genetic information across genera are not sufficiently likely to result in new
combinations of traits to warrant a high degree of attention.
Therefore, it does not require the same amount of information
for such pesticides. Indeed, the Agency has concluded that most
potential registrants should have to go to no extra effort to secure the information necessary for Level I review. 171
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

7 U.S.C. § 136c (1982).
40 C.F.R. § 172.3(a) (1987).
See Foundation on Economic Trends v. Thomas, 637 F. Supp. 25 (D.D.C. 1986).
EPA Policy Statement, supra note 97, at 23,321-24.
Id. at 23,321.
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In sum, it appears that the EPA has the ability to gather extensive information on all genetically engineered pesticides prior
to sale or use in commerce and prior to large-scale testing. In
addition, the Agency plans to gather fairly extensive data on
most genetically engineered pesticides prior to small-scale testing. The only possible weakness in the scheme is the reduced
data requirements for determining whether full experimental
use permits will be required for Level I pesticides. It is not very
likely, however, that this weakness will prove very important,
because the vast majority of genetically engineered pesticides
will probably be derived from some organisms that are
pathogens. 172
The EPA is slowly assembling a staff with expertise in evaluating the information that the companies will be submitting for
registrations and experimental use permits. The EPA currently
devotes approximately ten staff persons with training in microbial ecology, microbiology, and plant pathology to reviewing
data on genetically engineered pesticides, and that number may
well expand as demand for data reviews increases. 173
Although the Agency will develop a full record for each decision to grant a full registration for a pesticide, it does not compile a full record for all experimental use permits. The Agency
has, however, agreed to provide a written scientific position for
each Level II proposal that identifies potential problems or significant unanswered questions after soliciting comments from a
work group in the EPA and from other federal agencies. 174 Finally, if an application for an experimental use permit raises
"complex or controversial scientific questions," 1111 the Agency
will provide its notification package and its scientific evaluation
to a group of independent scientists constituted as a subpanel of
its existing Scientific Advisory Panel for pesticides, and some
questions may, in turn, come under the scrutiny of the agencywide Biotechnology Scientific Advisory Committee. 176 The thorough review that the EPA undertook in connection with its decision to approve an experimental use permit for the "ice minus"
bacterial pesticide indicates that the EPA has the capacity to
evaluate the scientific information that is necessary to an in172. Raleigh Comments, supra note 157.
173. Telephone interview with Fred Betz, Supervisory Biologist, Hazard Evaluation
Division, Office of Pesticides Programs, EPA (Nov. 25, 1987).
174. EPA Policy Statement, supra note 97, at 23,322.
175. Id. at 23,323.
176. Raleigh Comments, supra note 157.
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formed decision. 177 Whether the Agency will subject future pesticides to such extensive review remains to be seen.
Although the EPA is currently sponsoring some research into
risk assessments for genetically engineered pesticides, it has not
developed satisfactory risk assessment models to use in evaluating permit applications. It is unclear how the EPA will determine the risks of a particular release. At present, the Agency has
adopted a case by case approach to assessing the risks of individual permit applications, the critical elements of which are the
scientific and policy judgments of the EP A's staff. Thus,
whether or not an adequate regulatory regime exists for evaluating industry-submitted data and assessing risks for genetically
engineered pesticides depends upon the co:nfidence that one has
in the scientific integrity and policy judgment of the EP A's
personnel.
b. Veterinary biological products- The USDA has established fairly elaborate testing requirements for veterinary biologics to ensure that products meet the statutory criteria for purity, safety, potency, and efficacy. 178 In particular, "Master
Seed" of bacteria, viruses, or other microorganisms must be approved by the USDA for use in the manufacture of veterinary
biologics. Primary cell lines used for the production of Master
Seed must be tested to demonstrate that they are free of bacteria, fungi, mycoplasma, viruses, and other extraneous agents.
Tumorigenicity and oncogenicity tests must be conducted on cell
lines if direct or indirect evidence indicates that the cell may
induce malignancies in the species for which the product is intended.179 The regulations do not explicitly require testing if
there is no such evidence. 180 Most products must be tested in
mice for seven days to detect any adverse effects, 181 and they
must also undergo specific field tests. 182
The USDA does not propose to treat genetically engineered
veterinary biological products differently from products produced through other means. It has promised to evaluate each·
177. See Foundation on Economic Trends v. Thomas, 637 F. Supp. 25 (D.D.C. 1986).
178. 9 C.F.R. § 113 (1987); see Coordinated Framework Hearing, supra note 3, at
126 (testimony of Karen Darling, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Mktg. & Inspection
Servs., USDA).
179. 9 C.F.R. § 113.52(h) (1987). Indirect evidence might come from required and
host animal tests for other purposes. Espeseth Comments, supra note 10.
180. In practice, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service in the USDA refers
biologics that might leave residues in beef or milk to the Food Safety and Inspection
Service for further input. Espeseth Interview, supra note 104.
181. 9 C.F.R. § 113.33(b)(l) (1987); Espeseth Interview, supra note 104.
182. Espeseth Interview, supra note 104.
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product on a case by case basis, and it may require additional
tests when live microorganisms are present in the biological
products. 183
Although the USDA's regulations prohibit the shipment of experimental biologics without a license, the Department has not
followed the EPA's lead in promulgating special regulations governing licenses for experimental uses of veterinary biologics. The
Department proposes to deal with license applications on a case
by case basis. Typically, the Department requires biologics to be
tested in controlled field settings, subject to quarantines, prior
to licensing a product. 184 Whether this approach is adequate depends almost entirely upon the degree of confidence one has in
the officials in charge of experimental use licensing.
The USDA currently has a staff of seven veterinarians and
one biometrician to evaluate biologic license applications. The
staff also includes two persons with Ph.D.'s in microbiology, and
one of these has had recombinant DNA research experience.
Three of the veterinarians have Masters degrees in microbiology
or related fields. The Department also hopes to employ an environmental scientist in the near-future to prepare environmental
assessments for license applications. 185 This staff currently handles a workload of approximately 150 license applications per
year.1ss
The USDA has created no formal mechanism for peer review
of information submitted in connection with license applications.187 However, the USDA staff refers questions on licensing
data to a separate staff at a USDA laboratory in Ames, Iowa.
That laboratory performs separate tests to confirm the data
prior to licensing new products. 188 Finally, data supporting any
permit applications for live recombinant microorganisms and environmental assessments for such permits must be submitted to
a recently established Veterinary Services Biotechnology Com183. Id.; U.S. Department of Agriculture, Final Policy Statement for Research and
Regulation of Biotechnology Processes and Products, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,336, 23,340 (1986)
[hereinafter USDA Policy Statement].
184. Espeseth Interview, supra note 104. The Department's chief concern is that a
modified live organism that is used to convey immunity to such organisms does not revert over several generations to the virulent form. So far, such a reversion to a virulent
form has never been documented.
185. Id.
186. Id. The USDA has granted a total of 70 establishment licenses and approximately 1500 product licenses for veterinary biologics. Coordinated Framework Hearing,
supra note 3, at 125 (testimony of Karen Darling, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Mktg.
& Inspection Servs., USDA).
187. Espeseth Interview, supra note 104.
188. Id.
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mittee, 189 but this committee is primarily engaged in reviewing
broad policy questions, rather than individual data submissions.
The current data requirements for veterinary biologics seem
adequate for products produced through conventional techniques. Whether they are adequate for genetically engineered biologics depends on the validity of the USDA's assumption that
their risks do not differ significantly from those of conventional
biologies and on the ability of USDA officials to detect individual instances where more testing is necessary.
The USDA has not developed generic risk assessment methodologies for veterinary biologics. In practice, the Department
relies heavily upon small-scale field tests. If the biologic has any
adverse effects on the test animals, it will probably not be licensed. The agency conducts periodic follow-up studies of
treated animals to determine if a biologic causes side effects in
sensitive subpopuiations. 19O
The Department has devoted little attention to risks that veterinary biologics might pose to nontarget wildlife species. It believes that the host species is usually the most susceptible species to the microorganism that is the target of the vaccine,
because most microorganisms have a limited host range. However, the Department will generally require data to evaluate host
range for live genetically engineered vaccines before approving
field trials. 191 Tests in laboratory rodents increase the Department's confidence in the results of the small-scale tests. Finally,
even assuming that a nontarget species was affected by a biologic, the most likely outcome would be that the nontarget
animal would be immunized against the target microorganism. 192
The Department does, however, plan to consider effects on
nontarget species to some extent in preparing environmental assessments for genetically engineered biologics. 193
c. Animal diseases- The USDA does not require applicants
for permits for interstate transport of microorganisms causing
animal diseases to undertake any particular testing regime; 10•
nor has the USDA identified models for assessing the risks of
particular microorganisms. 196 The USDA has not even published
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Espeseth Comments, supra note 10.
192. Espeseth Interview, supra note 104.
193. Lidsky Comments, supra note 157.
194. Ketter Interview, supra note 112.
195. The USDA does conduct its own tests for imported microorganisms and vectors
of microorganisms at its Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory in Plum Island,
New York. See USDA Policy Statement, supra note 183, at 23,341.
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a list of microorganisms that are known to cause diseases in animals. Although such a list would not necessarily be definitive, it
could aid genetic engineers by making them aware of hosts and
vectors that might be suspect. As the regulations now read, it is
apparently up to the manufacturer or transporter to determine
whether its genetically engineered microorganism is capable of
causing disease in animals, and the USDA's regulations do not
prescribe any procedures for finding out whether a genetically
engineered microorganism should be so characterized. To the extent that the manufacturer does not voluntarily produce data, it
will not be forthcoming. This aspect of the USDA's regulatory
regime is entirely inadequate as a mechanism for evaluating the
capacity of genetically engineered microorganisms to cause diseases in animals. Once again, the EPA will have to use its TSCA
powers to play a gap-filling role.
d. Plant pests- The current regulatory regime for ordinary
plant pests does not contain any data-gathering requirements. 196
Agency scientists, in reviewing permit applications, rely primarily upon an extensive world literature on plant pests. 197 The
literature is examined for pests of wild plants, as well as for
pests of domestic crops. 198 Because the USDA has in the past
authorized the movement of plant pests only for experimental
purposes,1 99 it is probably understandable that the Department
has not specified particular data-gathering requirements for permits. The USDA's recent regulations requiring permits for "regulated articles," 200 however, has required the Department to implement new information gathering requirements for genetically
engineered microorganisms.
To obtain a permit under the proposed regulations, the applicant must submit descriptions of the expression of the modified
organism, the purpose for its introduction into the environment,
the country or locality of origin of the donor organism, and the
processes, procedures, and safeguards that would be used to prevent contamination, release, and dissemination of donor or196. The applicant for a permit must submit information about the nature of the
pest, the method of shipment, and mitigation measures, but this information is usually
readily available without additional data gathering efforts. 7 C.F.R. § 330,201 (1987).
197. Telephone interview with Arnold Foudin, Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service, USDA (Mar. 2, 1987) [hereinafter Foudin Interview].
198. Id.
199. See Microbial Products, supra note 137, at 50,901. The USDA does allow some
movement of plant pests for nonexperimental purposes. For example, some beneficial
biocontrol agents are also plant pests, but the Department still issues permits for them
because their benefits outweigh the risks. Foudin Interview, supra note 197.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 115-24.
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ganisms, recipient organisms, and vector or vector agents into
the environment. 201 The proposed regulations do not, however,
require any specific testing for potential damage to plants or animals. The Department will consult the world literature on the
potential pathogenicity of the host organism and its ability to
survive in particular environments, but there are no standard
protocols for evaluating the potential pathogenicity of particular
microorganisms, and the Department has no plans to design any
protocols. 202
The Department may require additional testing on a case by
case basis. Although such testing requirements will focus primarily upon crop plants, such tests may well reveal risks to
other wild plants. 203 The USDA will probably not, however, require specific tests to evaluate risks posed to wild plants, unless
something in the current literature suggests a reason for doing
so.20•
The proposed regulations give no indication of the nature of
the risk assessment that the agency will employ in issuing permits. Despite criticism for failing to support risk oriented research, 2011 the Department has not developed any risk assessment
models, and agency scientists are unaware of any models for predicting plant pathogenicity of genetically engineered microorganisms. 206 USDA scientists intend to apply their own experience
on a case by case basis to determine the pathogenic potential of
particular regulated articles. 207
The USDA employs nine professionals to evaluate permit applications. Most are specialists in plant pathology, but the group
also includes a microbiologist and a geneticist. 208 The staff evaluates between one and three applications per week, but most of
the applications involve easily evaluated permits for movement
of pests from one place to another, rather than for deliberate
releases into the environment. 209 Because the agency expects a
"tidal wave" of permit applications in the near future, it is at201. Introduction of Organisms, supra note 119, at 22,911.
202. Foudin Interview, supra note 197.
203. Id.; Medley Interview, supra note 53.
204. Foudin Interview, supra note 197.
205. See infra text accompanying note 255.
206. Foudin Interview, supra note 197.
207. Id.
208. Id.; see also Coordinated Framework Hearing, supra note 3, at 126-27 (testimony of Karen Darling, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Mktg. & Inspections Servs.,
USDA) (describing overall resources available to the USDA for plant protection and
quarantine).
209. Foudin Interview, supra note 197.
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tempting to boost its staff to at least twenty-five professionals. 210
Whether that number will be sufficient remains to be seen.
If a permit application raises no questions that cannot easily
be answered by USDA staff and if it raises no "controversial"
scientific questions, the permit decision is made without peer review. When peer review is necessary, the question is referred to
a "parent committee," composed of scientists drawn from across
the Department, for advice. 211 The recently established Departmentwide Agriculture Biotechnology Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee is also available to offer scientific advice for genetically engineered plants and microorganisms. 212
e. Other uses- The TSCA gives the EPA authority to require manufacturers of chemical substances to make information
available to the Agency for risk assessments. The EPA has interpreted the premanufacture notification requirement, discussed
previously, 213 to give it authority to require companies to submit
a minimum data base to allow the Agency to determine whether
it should object to the distribution of the substance during the
ninety-day period that the Agency has to evaluate the
premanufacture notice. 214 On the assumption that, in the absence of data to the contrary, all microorganisms may present a
risk because of their potential to reproduce and exhibit new
traits, the Agency requires general background information on
the source organism and some limited test data on the organism
indicating its potential for survival, replication, dissemination,
and genetic exchange with other organisms. 2111 In addition, manId.
211. Id.
212. See Coordinated Framework Hearing, supra note 3, at 111-17 (testimony of
Orville Bentley, Assistant Secretary for Science & Educ., USDA); Planned Release
Hearing, supra note 3, at 55 (testimony of Robert M. Goodman, Vice President, Research & Dev., Calgene, Inc.) (describing scientific resources available to the USDA).
213. See supra text accompanying notes 132-34.
214. To place genetically engineered microorganisms on its inventory, the EPA requires specific information on the organisms, including source organisms, methods used
to manipulate source organisms, and the special functions obtained by the manipulation.
In addition, the EPA requires manufacturers to submit information on deliberately released microorganisms relevant to risk assessment, including the purpose and intended
effect of the application, site of application, numbers of microorganisms and methods of
application, containment and mitigation measures, and monitoring. EPA Policy Statement, supra note 97, at 23,327.
215. Id.; see Coordinated Framework Hearing, supra note 3, at 133 (testimony of
John Moore, Assistant Adm'r for Pesticides & Toxic Substances, EPA). The authority
for this stance is 15 U.S.C. § 2604(b)(2) (1982), which requires manufacturers to submit
with their premanufacture notices data that show that the substance will not present an
unreasonable risk of injury to health or to the environment. The EPA plans to require
similar data under a significant new use rule for microorganisms that are the products of
210.
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ufacturers have a duty, independent of any EPA request, to
maintain records of "significant adverse reactions to health or
the environment" alleged to have been caused by a chemical
substance, and the EPA may inspect such records. 216
Beyond acquiring this minimum data set, the Agency also has
authority to prevent the distribution and use of a chemical substance that is the subject of a premanufacture notice, pending
the development of additional information. The EPA may do so
if it determines that "the information available to the [Agency]
is insufficient to permit a reasoned evaluation" of its health and
environmental effects, and either the substance may present an
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment in the
absence of such information, or the substance will be produced
in substantial quantities and may reasonably be anticipated to
enter the environment in substantial quantities or there may be
significant human exposure to the substance. 217 It may be relatively easy for the Agency to make such determinations early in
the evolution of agricultural biotechnologies because any significant release of a genetically engineered microorganism into the
environment will ultimately be produced in substantial quantities and enter the environment in substantial quantities.
A major weakness in this data-gathering authority is the procedure that the Agency must use if a manufacturer is not cooperative. The order prohibiting or limiting the use of the substance pending required testing does not become effective for
thirty days, during which time the manufacturer may file objections. If an objection is filed, the order does not go into effect,
and the Agency must sue in a federal district court for an injunction to prohibit or limit the use of the substance, pending
the submission of the required information. 218 This ponderous
process provides a great disincentive to issuing data-gathering
orders. 219
Because the EPA's TSCA implementation program has in the
past been exclusively devoted to regulating chemicals, the EPA
intrageneric transfers of genes from a pathogen to a nonpathogen or of genes from a
nonpathogen to a pathogen. EPA Policy Statement, supra note 97, at 23,330.
216. 15 U.S.C. § 2607(c) (1982).
217. Id. § 2604(e).
218. Id. § 2604(e)(B)-(C).
219. See NRDC Comments, supra note 147, at 21. The EPA also has broad authority
to require testing of chemical substances under § 4 of the TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2603
(1982), but this authority has rarely been exercised, and it will not be available in any
event until the microorganism is already out in the environment. Still, it does provide
authority for the EPA to require follow-up data gathering after the microorganism has
been released.
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does not presently have a large staff of people trained in evaluating the risks of genetically engineered microorganisms. At this
point the Office of Toxic Substances includes two microbial geneticists, two molecular biologists, two microbial ecologists, and
one plant pathologist. 220 The Agency has established a Biotechnology Scientific Advisory Committee to provid,e technical advice, and it plans to supplement its staff with experts from other
government agencies, academia, and other independent sources
to help in evaluating the quality of health and safety data for
genetically engineered microorganisms. 221
The EPA has not crafted any particular risk assessment models for biotechnology. The Agency has suggested that some of
the risk assessment approaches that it has found useful for
nonengineered microbial pesticides will be relevant to genetically engineered microorganisms, but it acknowledges that these
models may have to be adapted to address special problems. 222
Although it has developed a research plan to identify risk assessment models for biotechnology, 223 the Agency has adopted a case
by case approach to risk assessment in the near term. 22"
2. Genetically engineered plants- The FPP A provides an
adequate regime for plants that are plant parasites, with the caveats already mentioned in connection with microorganisms. 225
For other genetically engineered plants, only the Noxious Weed
Act is available. Although that statute would allow the USDA to
require information about a noxious weed prior to obtaining a
permit to transport it, there is no vehicle for forcing the manufacturer of a genetically engineered plant to run tests to determine whether it is likely to be a noxious weed. 226 The Department has taken no action to require submission of information
220. Telephone interview with Mark Segal, Senior Scientist, Chemical Review and
Evaluation Branch, Health and Environmental Review Division, Office of Toxic Substances, EPA (Dec. 19, 1987); Telephone interview with Jane Rissler, Director, Biotechnology Division, Office of Toxic Substances, EPA (Mar. 10, 1987).
221. This built-in flexibility to change the scope of regulation as more knowledge is
gained about genetically engineered plants and microorganisms is critical, but it must be
exercised in a public forum. The matter is important enough to warrant notice and comment rulemaking procedures. EPA Policy Statement, supra note 97, at 23,328.
222. Id.
223. See Planned Release Hearing, supra note 3, at 160-61 (testimony of John
Moore, Assistant Adm'r for Pesticides & Toxic Substances, EPA).
224. EPA Policy Statement, supra note 97, at 23,328.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 196-207. If the USDA is correct in interpreting "plant pest" broadly to include nonparasitic plants, see supra text accompanying
note 158, then the regime comes much closer to the ideal for genetically engineered
plants. As previously discussed, however, this ambitious interpretation is not likely to
withstand judicial challenge.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 159-62.
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about genetically engineered plants that are not on its existing
list of noxious weeds except for those weeds that are parasitic
plants. The current regulatory regime is, therefore, unable to
regulate adequately nonparasitic plants.

C. Risk Management
1. Genetically engineered microorganisms- Just as it is appropriate to distinguish between plants and microorganisms in
assessing risks, it makes sense to draw the same distinction in
deciding how society will manage those risks. Different technologies are available to reduce the risks of plants and microorganisms, and different techniques are available to avoid unnecessary exposures.
a. Pesticides- The licensing system for pesticides is the
EP A's primary risk management tool. The operative legal document is the label on the licensed pesticide. The EPA manages
pesticide risks primarily through its initial licensing decisions
(and some fairly rare pesticide cancellation actions) and through
conditions that are specified on the pesticide label. 227
Less stringent regulatory controls apply to experimental use
permits. Although the EPA must approve Level II small-scale
testing, an applicant for a permit for a small-scale Level I test
may commence testing after thirty days if the EPA does not object. The EPA has promulgated no specific regulatory criteria for
granting experimental use permits for genetically engineered microorganisms, electing instead to deal with applications on a case
by case basis. 228 As it acquires more experience with such permit
applications, the Agency should attempt to identify generic criteria and attempt to make the process more standardized.
b. Veterinary biological products- Like the pesticide risk
management regime, the statutory mechanism for veterinary biologics relies heavily upon a license system. The USDA has very
few constraints on its authority to condition establishment and
product permits on compliance with safety related requirements.
The USDA also has in place a regime for authorizing experimental uses of veterinary biologics. Although the Department will
license a biological product when it is shown that the benefits of
227. For example, the EPA can specify on the label that a pesticide may only be used
by applications that are certified by the EPA or the states. 7 U.S.C. § 136(b) (1982).
228. See NRDC Comments, supra note 147, at 18-19.
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particular uses outweigh the risks, 229 it takes the position that
any risk is unacceptable if a safer substitute exists. 230 In addition, the Department attempts to impose management practices
that minimize any remaining risks. 231 Except for the previously
discussed exemption for intrastate use of experimental biologies
in nonlicensed facilities, the USDA regime seems to provide adequate risk management authority.
c. Animal diseases- The permit regime for animal diseases
gives the USDA open-ended authority to condition permits upon
safety precautions. The regime would therefore be adequate for
agricultural biotechnologies if it were capable of defining the
universe of microorganisms to which it applied. As we have
seen, 232 however, the regulatory regime for animal diseases does
not contain any prerelease testing requirements. Until the
USDA becomes aware of the disease-causing propensities of a
genetically engineered microorganism, the permit requirement is
essentially irrelevant. As a practical matter, the USDA is not
likely to discover that a genetically engineered microorganism is
capable of causing animal disease until it has already caused
some damage. Moreover, it is not clear that the Department will
aggressively use its authority to protect noncommercially useful
species, such as reptiles or insects.
d. Plant pests- The Department has adopted a permitting
approach for managing the risks of genetically engineered microorganisms that are plant pests. Although the FPPA is not explicit as to the standard to be applied in awarding permits for
the transport of plant pests, the Department has taken the position that no risks to plants should be allowed unless they can be ,
adequately managed. 233 For example, even when benefits outweigh risks, the Department insists, to the extent possible, that
risks be mitigated. 234 For example, the permitting officers attempt to ensure that microorganisms contain some kind of
"switch" that allows them to be "turned off'' if they are found to
cause environmental harm. 23 ~ Although the permit officers consider risks to noncrop species in meeting the Department's obligations under the National Environmental Policy Act and the
Endangered Species Act, they take a "realistic" anthropocentric
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Espeseth Interview, supra note 104.
Id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 194-95.
Foudin Interview, supra note 197.
Id.
Id.
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view. 236 In light of the Agency's excellent track record with respect to managing the risks involved in the importation of
known plant pests, the approach should be adequate for microorganisms that come within the definition of "regulated article"
in the new regulations.
The USDA's recently promulgated regulations, however, contain a provision that could potentially undermine the "gap-filling" function of the TSCA. The regulations allow the USDA to
issue a "courtesy permit" for genetically engineered microorganisms "which are not subject to regulation under [the regulations] to facilitate movement when the movement might otherwise be impeded because of the similarity of the organisms to
other organisms regulated under [the regulations]." 237 An application for a courtesy permit need not include any particular
data; it need only include a "statement explaining why [the applicant] believes the organism or product does not come within
the definition of regulated article." 238 Although the courtesy permit may be a reasonable technique for avoiding unnecessary review under the FPP A, it should not serve as a vehicle for avoiding premanufacture notification under the TSCA. Despite the
EP A's commendable attempt to coordinate with the USDA, it
should take the firm position that a "courtesy permit" issued by
the USDA does not relieve a manufacturer of its obligation to
file a premanufacture notification with the EPA under the
TSCA and to comply with any testing requirements that the
EPA imposes.
e. Other uses- The EPA can manage the risks of the remaining agricultural uses of genetically engineered microorganisms under its TSCA authority to protect the environment
from unreasonable risks of chemical substances. Unlike the
FIFRA and the agricultural statutes, however, the TSCA does
not erect a permitting regime. After submitting a premanufacture notice and waiting ninety days, a company is free to manufacture, distribute, or use a chemical substance until the EPA
promulgates a rule prohibiting, limiting, or otherwise regulating
its use.
The Agency may at any time issue a rule under section 6 of
the TSCA imposing the least burdensome of seven listed requirements if the Agency has a "reasonable basis to conclude"
236. Id. For example, if a genetically engineered microorganism posed risks only to
dandelions, the Department probably would not deny a permit. Id.
237. Introduction of Organisms, supra note 119, at 22,913.
238. Id.
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that a chemical substance's manufacture, distribution, or use
"will present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment."239 The listed requirements range from a prohibition
on the manufacturing, distribution, or use of the substance to a
requirement that it be labelled. 2 " 0 If the EPA's initial assessment of the information submitted with a premanufacture notification provides a "reasonable basis to conclude" that the sale,
distribution, or use of a chemical substance "will present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment" before a
section 6 rule can be promulgated, the Agency may issue a rule
imposing roughly the same requirements that could be imposed
under section 6 prior to initial release of the substance. In either
case, the burden is on the EPA to justify any conditions that it
places on the distribution and use of the substance. As a practical matter, it is considerably more difficult for the EPA to justify the imposition of requirements upon a substance that has
not yet been introduced into the environment under the TSCA
than it is under the FIFRA or the agricultural statutes. Hence,
the EPA has adequate risk management authority only to the
extent that it vigorously polices premanufacture notifications
and devotes considerable resources to seeking injunctions in district court when the information that accompanies a
premanufacture notification is inadequate. 241 Nevertheless, the
EPA has resisted suggestions that the TSCA be amended to give
the Agency more complete authorization power. 242
2. Genetically engineered plants- Parasitic genetically engineered plants come within the previously discussed regulatory
regime for plant pests. The Noxious Weed Act establishes a permit process for plants determined to be "noxious weeds." As discussed, however, the current regulatory regime will not reach all
genetically engineered plants, because it lacks a mechanism for
prerelease testing.

D.

Public Participation

1. Genetically engineered microorganisms- Although there
is no obvious reason why the public should be less interested in
genetically engineered plants than in genetically engineered mi239.
240.
241.
242.
Moore,

15 u.s.c. § 2605 (1982).
Id. § 2605(a).
See supra text accompanying notes 213-24.
Coordinated Framework Hearing, supra note 3, at 132 (testimony of John
Assistant Adm'r for Pesticides & Toxic Substances, EPA).
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croorganisms, the current statutes generally provide for greater
public participation in the regulation of microorganisms than
plants.
a. Pesticides- Under the FIFRA, the EPA must publish notice in the Federal Register of each application to register new
products or new uses of existing products. The public then has
thirty days to comment on the application. 243 Although the statute does not provide for public participation in the experimental
use permit process, the EPA has voluntarily allowed public participation in those applications for experimental use permits
that may have "regional or national significance." 24 • Unfortunately, most of the information upon which the EPA bases its
experimental use permit and registration decisions is shielded
from public scrutiny until the EPA has completed its decisionmaking process. Potential registrants almost always claim that
their health and safety data constitute "trade secrets" that' are
protected from public disclosure. 245 Although the statute requires the release of health and safety data to the public-despite trade secrecy claims-after the EPA has made a final registration decision, 246 the public can have access to such
data prior to the registration decision only if the registrant is
willing to share them with the public. Although some of the
early applicants for experimental use permits have commendably forsworn their trade secrecy claims, there is no guarantee
that they will continue to do so in the future. Insofar as registrants are unwilling to share safety related information with the
public prior to registration, the public participation provision of
the current regulatory scheme for pesticides is inadequate.
Once the EPA decides, perhaps on the basis of alleged trade
secret information, to grant registration for a pesticide, there
need be no public hearing before the product enters commerce. 247 Environmental groups seeking to challenge the factual
or legal basis of a registration decision must appeal to a federal
district court. 248
b. Veterinary biological products- The current USDA regulations for licensing veterinary biological products and estab243. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(4) (1982).
244. EPA Policy Statement, supra note 97, at 23,323. Apparently the Agency, at its
sole discretion, makes the determination whether an experimental use permit is of "regional or national significance."
245. See supra note 76.
246. 7 U.S.C. § 136h(d)(2) (1982).
247. This contrasts starkly with the absolute right of the applicant for a pesticide
registration to demand a hearing if the EPA denies registration. Id. § 136a(c)(6).
248. Id. § 136n(a).
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lishments do not provide for any public participation in the licensing decisions, and the USDA's recent policy statements
suggest no role for the public apart from the right to comment
upon any environmental impact statements. The Agency, in fact,
has no provision for making the public generally aware of applications for product licenses or for permits to conduct field
tests. 249 Although most significant field tests will probably require an environmental assessment, the assessment will not necessarily reveal the test site, 2110 or be available to the public in
time for effective public comment prior to release. 2111 The regime
for animal biologics is therefore utterly inadequate with respect
to public participation.
c. Animal diseases- There are no provisions for making the
public aware of, or for allowing public participation in, USDA
decisions to permit the interstate transport of animal diseases.
Thus, the USDA regulatory regime is inadequate from the
standpoint of public participation.
d. Plant pests- Neither the existing regulations for licensing the import and transport of ordinary plant pests nor the new
regulations for "regulated articles" provide for any public awareness of, or participation in, licensing decisions beyond the opportunity to read and comment upon the Agency's environmental assessments. 2112 Any other information relevant to the
decision, such as any studies required of the permittee, may be
requested under the Freedom of Information Act (subject to its
exemption for confidential business information), 2113 but will not
routinely be made available to the public. 211• Reacting to several
negative comments on its proposed rules, 2511 however, the USDA
has adopted a procedure for petitioning the Agency to include or
249. Espeseth Interview, supra note 104.
250. Id.
251. The USDA plans to give the public 30 days to comment on environmental impact assessments. Espeseth Comments, supra note 10. It is not clear that 30 days is
enough time for members of the public to provide written responses to environmental
assessments. Much will depend upon the thoroughness of the assessments themselves.
252. Foudin Interview, supra note 197.
253. In the past, most biotechnology companies have claimed virtually all of the information submitted to be trade secrets. Id.
254. Id.; see Statement of Assemblyman Lloyd Connelly, Before the USDA, Sacramento, Cal. (July 29, 1986) (complaining that his staff was told by the USDA that he
would have to file a Freedom of Information Act request to discover what genetically
engineered products the Department had under review).
255. See Letter from Richard D. Godown, Executive Director, Industrial Biotechnology Association, to Dr. James Glosser, Associate Administrator, Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service 7 (Sept. 24, 1986) (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.).
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remove a host or sector from its list of potential plant
pathogens. 2116
e. Other uses- The EPA publishes public notice of each
TSCA premanufacture notification that it receives. 2117 In addition, the Agency must on a monthly basis publish a list of all
premanufacture notices for which the ninety-day response period has not expired. 2118 Chemical manufacturers, however, typically claim that virtually the entire contents of their
premanufacture submissions and any required premanufacture
testing constitute trade secrets. Although the EPA usually
makes an effort to describe in generic terms the nature of the
substance at issue and the results of health and safety testing, it
is nevertheless often difficult for the public to decide on the basis of publicly available information whether it should be concerned about the product. The statute requires that health and
safety data be made available to the public, despite trade secrecy claims, 2119 but the Agency generally does not force the issue
until a request has been filed under the Freedom of Information
Act.
The TSCA makes no provision for a public hearing prior to
the expiration of the ninety days during which the EPA may act
to prevent the manufacture of the chemical. The EPA may nevertheless voluntarily conduct a hearing on a premanufacture notification, and it has recently done so with respect to the first
notification for a genetically engineered microorganism. 260 Any
member of the public may, however, comment in writing on the
risks and benefits of any substance that is the subject of a
premanufacture notification during the ninety-day period. In addition, the Agency must publish reasons for any decision not to
take action with respect to a new chemical for which the Agency
has made a generic finding that release into the environment
"may present" an unreasonable risk of injury to health or to the
environment. 261 There is, of course, no public participation with
respect to substances that are released in connection with pri256. 52 Fed. Reg. 22,913 (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. § 340.4).
257. 15 U.S.C. § 2604(d)(2) (1982).
258. Id. § 2604(d)(3).
259. Id. § 2613(b)-(c).
260. See Pesticide and Toxic Chemical News, Feb. 11, 1987, at 3; Mellon Comments,
supra note 37.
261. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2604(g), 2604(b)(4)(A)(i) (1982). Although the Administrator is required to publish a statement of reasons prior to the expiration of the 90-day period,
failure to publish the statement does not prevent the manufacturer from distributing the
substance after the expiration of the 90-day period. Id. § 2604(g).
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vately sponsored research and development that is not for commercial purposes. 282
2. Genetically engineered plants- Neither the FPPA nor
the Noxious Weed Act provides for public participation in decisions about the release of genetically engineered plants beyond
the opportunity to read and comment upon the Agency's environmental assessment, and the USDA has not acted on its own
to expand public participation in those decisions. 283
V.

~

WILLINGNESS TO REGULATE

A regulatory regime based upon the most generous statutory
authority will be inadequate if the agency administering the program is unwilling to regulate efficiently and effectively. The perceived willingness of a regulatory agency to regulate is critical to
the trust that the public places in its decisions and, consequently, to the public's confidence in the regulated technology.
The experience of nuclear power regulation in the United States
is often cited as an example of how not to secure public trust in
a regulatory agency and its regulated industry. 284 Part of the
current debate over biotechnology is directed to the perceived
willingness of the USDA and the EPA effectively to assess and
manage its risks.
Although it is too early to tell how effective a regulator the
USDA will be, there are disturbing indications that it may not
function as an aggressive overseer. First, the Department finds
itself in the same sort of "institutional conflict of interest" that
characterized the old Atomic Energy Commission. 26 c; The same
institutional entity that has the responsibility for regulating the
technology to prevent unacceptable risks is also charged with
promoting it. For example, the USDA has boasted that it "has
been in the forefront in the development of modern biotechnol262. See supra text accompanying notes 146-48.
263. The Noxious Weed Act does have a provision for a public hearing on the decision whether to list a plant as a noxious weed, see supra note 53, but there is no public
participation in the decision whether or not to issue a permit for the interstate transport
of a listed weed. The USDA has-also adopted a process whereby a person may petition
the agency to include a plant that is a plant pest on its long list of regulated articles. 52
Fed. Reg. 22,913 (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. § 340.4).
264. See generally, E. ROLPH, NUCLEAR PowER AND THE PUBLIC SAFETY (1979); K.
SHRADER-FRECHETTE, NUCLEAR POWER AND PUBLIC POLICY (1980).
265. E. ROLPH, supra note 264; K. SHRADER-FRECHETTE, supra note 264.
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ogy," 266 and it has generally demonstrated an unrestrained enthusiasm for agricultural biotechnologies. 267 There are occasional
signs of struggle between the promoters and the regulators
within the Department. 268 The Department's research budget reflects an almost single-minded focus on the benefits of agricultural biotechnology and a relatively modest concern for exploring its potential risks. 269
Perhaps the most disturbing indication of the USDA's "go-go"
attitude toward the benefits of biotechnology is a recently held
"Challenge Forum on Biotechnology," in which representatives
from the USDA and the biotechnology industry extolled its virtues and belittled its risks. No representatives from public interest or environmental groups were invited to attend the Chal266. Microbial Products, supra note 137, at 50,898; see also Coordinated Framework
Hearing, supra note 3, at 119 (testimony of Orville Bentley, Assistant Secretary for Science & Educ., USDA) ("It is the policy of the USDA to encourage and support the responsible development and utilization of beneficial products of modern biotechnology
consistent with the protection of public safety and the environment.").
267. See GAO USDA REPORT, supra note 4, at 60. Professor Robert Colwell, an ecologist who has advised the USDA on the environmental impacts of agricultural biotechnology has observed:
Traditionally, the U.S.D.A. has seen itself as not only an active promoter (and
funder) of basic research, but also as a sort of travelling salesman of applied
technology, working closely with seed companies, agrochemical firms, and farm
machinery manufacturers to achieve the laudable goal of helping America's
farmers and ranchers to maximize their productivity. I anticipate that in five
years, Agricultural Extension agents will be promoting the use of genetically engineered crops, farm animals, and microbial inputs. Meanwhile, we are assured
by unnamed "knowledgeable ARS [Agricultural Research Service] official[s]"
and unnamed Assistant Administrators that approval to release genetically engineered organisms "would not be given without careful scrutiny."
Planned Release Hearing, supra note 3, at 80. He concluded: "In retrospect, I think we
might have done well to have had the two roles of the U.S.D.A., as promoter and regulator, in separate and independent agencies." Id.
268. GAO USDA REPORT, supra note 4, at 52; Foudin Interview, supra note 197 (indicating that regulators received pressure from other offices not to undertake thorough
reviews of genetically engineered microorganisms that might be plant pests).
269. See Planned Release Hearing, supra note 3, at 42 (testimony of Martin Alexander, Professor of Agronomy, Cornell Univ.) (complaining of the lack of USDA support
for research into the risks of agricultural biotechnologies); id. at 80 (testimony of Robert
K. Colwell, Professor of Zoology, University of Cal., Berkeley, Cal.) (expressing same
concerns as Dr. Alexander); id. at 123 (testimony of Brian Crowley, Senior Assoc. Director, Resources, Community & Economic Dev. Div., U.S. Gen. Accounting Office). In
1984-1985, the USDA funded $40.5 million in biotechnology research. Eighty-seven of
778 projects involved the possibility of large-scale release. Of those, only three addressed
risk assessment as an integral part of the research plan. IssuEs IN FEDERAL REGULATION
REPORT, supra note 3, at 34. From October 1, 1983 to September 30, 1984, USDA funding for activities identified as risk assessment for biotechnology totalled approximately
$700,000. Planned Release Hearing, supra note 3, at 124 (testimony of Brian Crowley,
Senior Assoc. Director, Resources, Community & Economic Dev. Div., U.S. Gen. Accounting Office).
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lenge Forum and none were listed on the long participant list.
The USDA's summary of the proceedings, which can only be described as a glowing endorsement of modern agricultural biotechnology, contains the following exhortations:
New biotechnology techniques are extensions and refinements of older techniques for genetic manipulation. They
are not technological disjunctions such as the advent of
nuclear fission .
. . . [Modern biotechnology is] a quantum leap in understanding ... [It is] a bases-loaded home-run, a masterful event . . . we are witnessing the advent of a golden
age in agriculture ... a "Biological Age" with the potential to do for mankind in the 21st Century what the Machine Age did for industrialization in the 19th Century.
. . . One of the most profound challenges that we all
face is to overcome the common misapprehensions, or
myths, surrounding new biotechnology. Biotechnology
myths can be damaging when they confuse or mislead the
media, the Congress, and the public. Such myths can cost
us dearly in delaying the fruits of new technology that
may significantly improve the quality and duration of
life.
. Some think all biotech products are potentially
too dangerous . . . others call for a tight rein on biotech
research, making analogies to the introduction of kudzu,
gypsy moth, and chestnut blight. That's faulty, said one
speaker: Those introductions involved organisms totally
unrelated to the ecosystem ... new biotech products involve modification of organisms that are indigenous to
the parent ecosystem. 270
This one-sided view of biotechnology's benefits and risks does
not inspire confidence in the USDA as a regulator of agricultural
biotechnology.
The USDA has played the role of promoter and regulator of a
technology once before, when it was given the inconsistent tasks
270.
1987).

USDA Biotechnology Challenge Forum, Highlight Summary, at 1-4 (Feb. 11,
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of promoting and regulating pesticides. 271 While the USDA was
playing both roles, it registered hundreds of pesticides, many on
the basis of data that were later found to be wholly inadequate. 272 But it doggedly resisted all efforts to take proven "bad
actors" such as DDT and Aldrin/Dieldrin off the market. This
institutional conflict of interest was a major factor in the transfer of pesticide regulatory authority to the EPA in 1970. There
is little reason to believe that the same entity that did such a
poor job of regulating pesticides will do a better job of protecting society from the risks of agricultural biotechnologies.
The USDA's public statements indicate that it has firmly
adopted the position that genetically engineered plants and microorganisms are presumed to be no different than normal
plants and organisms. 273 This benign attitude stands in contrast
to many of the cautious statements of independent scientists
and other federal agencies. 274 Indeed, USDA scientists have been
highly critical of the EP A's cautious approach toward allowing
deliberate releases of genetically engineered microorganisms. 275
One scientist who has advised both the USDA and the EPA on
the environmental effects of genetically engineered microorganisms notes two "distinctly different 'flavors' " in regulatory approach: the EPA's evaluation process "maintained an air of impartial judgment," while the USDA found certain National
Institutes of Health guidelines in the agricultural arena to be
"unnecessarily onerous. " 276
271. The USDA regulated pesticides until 1970, when the function was transferred to
the EPA. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623, reprinted in 5 u.s.C. app. at
1132 (1982), and in 84 Stat. 2086, as amended by Act of Aug. 23, 1983, Pub. L. 98-80,
§ 2(a)(2), (b)(2), (c)(2)(C), 97 Stat. 485.
272. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS, RESEARCH, AND FOREIGN AGRICULTURE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON REGULATORY PROCEDURES AND PUBLIC HEALTH ISSUES IN THE EPA's OFFICE OF PESTICIDE PROGRAMS (Comm. Print 1982); STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND THE REGULATION OF PESTICIDES (Comm. Print
1976) [hereinafter KENNEDY REPORT].
273. See Planned Release Hearing, supra note 3, at 168 (testimony of John Patrick
Jordan, Administrator, Cooperative State Research Serv., USDA) ("[A]gricultural and
forestry products developed through the use of biotechnology will not differ fundamentally in use and application from conventional products."); GAO USDA REPORT, supra
note 4, at 27.
274. See A. Carr, supra note 56, at 3, 14.
275. See GAO USDA REPORT, supra note 4, at 47.
276. Planned Release Hearing, supra note 3, at 81 (testimony of Robert K. Colwell,
Professor of Zoology, University of Cal., Berkeley, Cal.); see also Coordinated Framework Hearing, supra note 3, at 79 (testimony of Elliott A. Norse, Director, Public Affairs
Office, The Ecological Soc'y of Am.) (complaining that the Coordinated Framework "is
unbalanced, leaning too far toward allowing releases of engineered organisms without the
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In its defense, the USDA points out that its promotional activities are segregated within the Department and are lodged
under an entirely different Assistant Secretary. 277 The Department has also made a commendable effort to keep the two functions separate in its Coordinated Framework policy announcements. 278 Moreover, the National Environmental Policy Act,
which did not exist during the days that the USDA regulated
pesticides, may have made the Department more sensitive to environmental concerns, 279 especially because an inadequate environmental impact assessment for a major action can result in a
burdensome lawsuit. 280 In addition, the USDA's past track record in protecting plants and animals from well known plant
pests, noxious weeds, and infectious diseases is impressive. 281
Nevertheless, the evidence of the USDA's institutional attitude
about modern biotechnology leaves a considerable lingering
doubt about its commitment to protecting society from the risks
of genetically engineered plants and microorganisms, 282 and
some have suggested that the best institutional arrangement
may be to place responsibility for regulating agricultural biotechnologies in another agency. 283
The obvious candidate for transfer of authority is the EPA,
which, in any event, will have a large role to play in regulating
agricultural biotechnologies. Although the EPA is not plagued
with the USDA's institutional conflict of interest, its effectiveness in regulating chemicals is far from exemplary. Its chemical
safeguards that are appropriate at this stage of the technology's development"); GAO
USDA REPORT, supra note 4, at 36 ("USDA officials did not want to impose cumbersome
regulations t'hat might stifle growth in biotechnology research or in the industries that
have sprung from that research.").
277. Planned Release Hearing, supra note 3, at 174 (testimony of John Patrick Jordan, Administrator, Cooperative State Research Serv., USDA).
278. See Coordinated Framework Hearing, supra note 3, at 123 (testimony of Karen
Darling, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Mktg. & Inspection Servs., USDA).
279. S. TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK (1984).
280. See GAO USDA REPORT, supra note 4, at 36 (indicating that USDA is worried
about lawsuits from opponents of biotechnology); see also Foundation on Economic
Trends v. Block, No. Civ. A. 84-3045 (D.D.C. Apr. 29, 1986) (WESTLAW, Allfeds library, DCT file) (holding that animal productivity research is not major federal action
requiring environmental assessment or environmental impact statement).
281. See GAO USDA REPORT, supra note 4, at 31.
282. For example, there are indications that the formal separation of promotional
and regulatory functions is more illusory than real. The Associate Administrator of
APHIS recently told a "Challenge Forum" that: "We in APHIS have been linked to ...
developments [in biotechnology] not only because of our regulatory responsibilities but
also because USDA with the people it represents, and the programs it supports, is one of
• the biggest beneficiaries of this science." Remarks of James W. Glosser, Associate Adm'r,
APHIS,. USDA, at the Biotechnology Challenge Forum (Feb. 5, 1987).
283. NRDC Comments, supra note 147.
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regulation program has promulgated fewer than a dozen major
rules regulating toxic substances in its eleven year history. 28" Although the pesticide program in the EPA was very active in the
mid-1970's, it too has been plagued by severe management and
morale problems. 2811 The EPA has also been criticized for failing
to register new pesticides in an expeditious fashion, a problem
that has plagued the newer biological pesticides even more severely than traditional chemical pesticides. 286 Thus, although environmental groups advocate giving the EPA exclusive authority
to regulate agricultural biotechnologies, biotechnology companies are largely satisfied with the USDA's determination to play
a major role.
It is very difficult to assess these arguments objectively. The
USDA's history and its recent statements belittling risks of agricultural biotechnology justify a fair degree of skepticism about
the willingness of that Department to be an effective regulator.
The Department's unconstrained optimism about the benefits of
agricultural biotechnology, exemplified in the recent "Secretary's Challenge Forum on Biotechnology," gives credence to the
charge that the Department is likely to accentuate the benefits
over the risks. On the other hand, the USDA's role in regulating
biotechnology is not a very large one. Its role in regulating
animal biologics is quite limited, and its regulatory program in
that area seems very effective. Apparently by choice, its program
for regulating animal diseases will be almost irrelevant to genetically engineered microorganisms. This regulatory function will
go by default to the EPA under the TSCA, so long as the EPA
does not erroneously assume that the USDA is in fact attempting to protect animals from new diseases resulting from genetically engineered microorganisms.
The only area in which USDA and EPA authorities overlap to
any significant degree is in protecting plants from genetically engineered microorganisms. It is possible that the EPA would do a
more effective job than the USDA in this area, but that is by no
means certain. The USDA has proposed a comprehensive regulatory scheme under the FPP A to regulate genetically engineered
microorganisms that may be plant pests. All indications are that
the USDA is serious about this job, despite pressures from elsewhere within the Department. The EPA also has a role to play
284. See id. at 31.
285. KENNEDY REPORT, supra note 272.
286. Hearings Before the House Comm. on Agriculture on Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act Extension, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 366 (1975) (testimony of
Jack D. Early, Vice President, National Agricultural Chems. Ass'n).
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under the TSCA in assessing the risks of genetically engineered
microorganisms that are not on the USDA's list of plant pest
hosts and vectors or that are not determined to be plant pests.
The USDA and the EPA have recognized the possibility for
overlap, and they have provided for coordinated reviews in these
instances to ensure that data requests are not duplicated. 287 Perhaps an adequate check on any perceived tendency on the
USDA's part to slight risks and. accentuate benefits is to provide
for dual review of all genetically engineered microorganisms that
might be plant pests. The obvious inefficiency of dual review
may be outweighed by the increased confidence that the public
is likely to have in the ultimate product.

VI.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

When we piece together the patchwork of statutes and regulatory programs, it becomes apparent that nearly all modern agricultural biotechnologies are addressed to some extent. When
measured against the elements of an adequate regulatory regime, however, there are some important gaps in coverage and
some inadequacies in the programs that are covered. As previously suggested, this should not be surprising given the orientation of the applicable statutes, but it is somewhat disappointing
that the EPA's gap-filling function under the TSCA has not provided a complete backstop.
A.

Prerelease Notification

Some large-scale releases of genetically engineered microorganisms that may be relevant to agriculture can take place under
the existing regulatory regimes without any notification to any
federal regulatory agency. Generally, the EPA must receive prerelease notification of all genetically engineered microorganisms,
even if no other program requires prerelease notification. 288
Thus, even though the USDA does not require prerelease notification of experimental biological products when the experiments
are undertaken in unlicensed facilities and there is no interstate
transport, the EPA would have to be notified: And even though
287. Introduction of Organisms, supra note 119, at 22,906.
288. There will be prerelease notification of all genetically engineered pesticides. See
supra text accompanying note 142.
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the USDA may not regard field testing of genetically engineered
microorganisms in the environment to constitute a "release," the
EPA probably considers it to be a release under the TSCA. The
fact that the USDA's authority to require prerelease notification
of interstate shipments of animal diseases and that even this requirement is largely applicable only to well-known diseases for
which the USDA has established quarantine programs only
mean that prerelease notification of microorganisms that might
cause animal diseases will go to the EPA, rather than the USDA.
Finally, to the extent that a person genetically engineers a product from the hosts and vectors on the USDA's list of potential
plant pests but determines that the final product does not meet
the definition of "plant pest," the EPA must be notified of the
new "chemical substance."
Before we can confidently conclude, however, that the EPA
will receive prerelease notification of all genetically engineered
microorganisms, we must examine some of the weaknesses and
gaps in the TSCA program. For example, the entire TSCA program may be inapplicable if the EP A's broad reading of the
words "chemical substance" to include genetically engineered
micr9organisms is not upheld by the courts. To avoid the regulatory instability that would accompany a lawsuit challenging the
EPA's authority to regulate biotechnology, Congress should enact a statute clarifying the EPA's gap-filling power in the context of biotechnology.
The TSCA's prerelease notification requirements do not reach
privately sponsored noncommercial research and development,
such as that undertaken in academic facilities without federal
grants. When Congress included this exemption in the TSCA, it
did not envision that the EPA would play a regulatory role with
respect to potentially harmful organisms that might proliferate
in the environment. Congress should now amend the TSCA to
give the EPA authority to require prerelease notification of any
deliberate releases of genetically engineered microorganisms, to
the extent that notification is not already forthcoming under
some other statute. Academic scientists are not immune from
the kinds of pressures that cause people to make errors of judgment, and they should not be treated differently as a matter of
principle. 289
Finally, the EPA has voluntarily exempted organisms resulting from intrageneric gene transfers when the host organism is
289. See generally McGarity, Contending Approaches to Regulating Laboratory
Safety, 28 KAN. L. REV. 183 (1980).
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nonpathogenic and organisms resulting from intergeneric transfers when the transferred material is only a well-characterized,
non-coding, regulatory region. 290 The first exemption may be
justified for reasons of administrative practicality and because it
is possible to make a generic determination that such organisms
are not likely to pose environmental risks. In any event, the exemption may not be very large, because the EPA has defined
"pathogen" very broadly to include most current recombinant
DNA activities. 291 The second exemption, which the USDA has
followed under the FPPA, 292 is probably unwarranted, and both
the EPA and the USDA should amend their regulations to repeal it.
Currently, there are virtually no legal requirements for prerelease notification of genetically engineered plants. Only the
USDA requires prerelease notification of genetically engineered
plants that are on the list of pathogenic organisms and vectors. 293 The TSCA does not give the EPA any gap-filling role
whatsoever for plants. Thus, there can be no assurance that the
harm producing potential of genetically engineered plants will
come to the attention of any agency prior to actual damage. Because genetically engineered plants may not pose the same risks
of widespread ecological damage as genetically engineered microorganisms, this may be deemed acceptable. If, however, Congress believes that prerelease notification of genetically engineered plants is desirable, it should amend the TSCA to give the
EPA the same gap-filling authority for plants that it gives it for
genetically engineered microorganisms.

B. Data Collection, Data Evaluation, and Risk Assessment
The ability of the EPA and the USDA to require proponents
of agricultural biotechnologies to submit health and safety data
prior to release varies greatly from program to program. For pesticides and veterinary biologics, the EPA and the USDA have
established data gathering and evaluation requirements that
290. See supra note 120.
291. EPA Policy Statement, supra note 97, at 23,333-34; Mellon Comments, supra
note 37.
292. See supra text accompanying notes 156-58.
293. The USDA's authority, however, probably only extends to parasitic plants. See
supra text accompanying note 158.
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seem adequate.m It is not clear at this point whether the USDA
will require very extensive testing for adverse environmental effects prior to release. 2911 The USDA has exercised its authority
under the FPPA to require testing for organisms on its list of
plant pathogens and vectors that are also plant pests, but it has
not developed testing protocols. The USDA might usefully examine the EPA's protocols for conventional biological pesticides
to provide guidance in its case by case evaluation of its data
needs.
Testing for genetically engineered microorganisms that are not
pesticides and not on the USDA's plant pest list will be required, if at all, by the EPA under its TSCA authority. Yet the
EPA can only require a bare minimum data set with
premanufacture notification, and it must be prepared to bear
the burden of proving in district court the need to prohibit the
release of an organism while additional data requirements are
being met. Given the novelty of agricultural biotechnologies,
Congress may conclude that this is not an adequate testing regime. If so, Congress could amend the TSCA to give the EPA
the authority to prevent the release of genetically engineered microorganisms if it is unable to determine whether their deliberate release will cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment without additional information. Congress could achieve
the same result by establishing a permitting regime similar to
that of the FIFRA and the FPP A.
There is currently no testing regime for genetically engineered
plants other than those listed on the USDA's plant pest list that
also meet the definition of "plant pest." 296 If Congress believes
that testing of genetically engineered plants is desirable, it
should amend the TSCA as suggested above to include plants as
well as microorganisms.

C.

Risk Management

Assuming that a permitting regime is adequate, the risk management regimes for pesticides, veterinary biologics, and plant
pests are adequate. Since the USDA's regulatory regime for
animal diseases is extremely limited, the EPA's TSCA authori294. The EPA's incomplete data requirements for its "Level I" evaluation of the
need for an experimental use permit for small-scale testing casts some doubt upon this
generally optimistic assessment.
295. See supra text accompanying notes 179-83.
296. Again, the USDA's authority probably does not extend beyond parasitic plants.
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ties will govern virtually all other agricultural biotechnologies.
Importantly, the TSCA does not establish a permitting regulatory regime. Manufacturers are free to distribute genetically engineered microorganisms ninety days after submitting a
premanufacture notification to the EPA, unless the EPA assumes the affirmative burden of demonstrating that the manufacture, distribution, or use of the substance will present an unreasonable risk of injury to humans or to the environment.
Under the current TSCA regime, inertia works in favor of the
release of the microorganism. This will only be satisfactory if the
EPA is given the resources to evaluate effectively the hundreds
of premanufacture notifications that it can expect to receive in
the near future. Otherwise, Congress should amend the TSCA to
give the EPA permitting authority similar to that of the
FIFRA. 297
The only available regulatory regimes for genetically engineered plants are the FPPA, which is limited to parasitic plants,
and the Noxious Weed Act, which is limited to interstate importation and transport of plants that are known to be weeds.
Neither of these authorities provides much protection for
nonparasitic plants until long after damage has occurred. If Congress determines that this is not an acceptable state of affairs, it
should amend either the FPP A or the TSCA to give the USDA
or the EPA authority to take action prior to the release of genetically engineered plants that might harm the environment.

D.

Public Participation

All of the USDA-administered regulatory regimes are woefully
inadequate from the perspective of public participation. None
provide for public hearings prior to release of genetically engineered microorganisms, and none even provide for public notice
of impending releases. The only public role is the very limited
one of commenting upon environmental impact statements in
cases in which they are prepared and commenting upon environmental assessments in the (perhaps) rare case in which a member of the public learns that an environmental assessment has
been prepared. The USDA should remedy this inadequate situation by writing procedural regulations that provide for publica297. But see Coordinated Framework Hearing, supra note 3, at 132 (testimony of
John Moore, Assistant Adm'r for Pesticides & Toxic Substances, EPA) (arguing against
amending the TSCA to establish a permitting regime).
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tion of permit applications for genetically engineered plants and
microorganisms and that allow for informed public comment.
The opportunities for public participation in the EPA's pesticide program are much more extensive, but they are still limited
by the inaccessibility of health and safety data prior to the decision to grant a registration or an experimental use permit and
the absence of a hearing prior to the registration decision. Although the EPA has commendably provided for an informal
public hearing prior to making experimental use permit decisions of "regional or national" significance, it has not adequately
explained why a public hearing would not be desirable for releases of only local significance. The Agency should allow public
participation in all experimental use permit determinations, and
it should attempt to facilitate citizen access to relevant health
and safety data.
Public participation under the TSCA is even more extensive
than under the FIFRA, but it too is plagued by the vexing problem of the trade secret status of health and safety testing data.
Because the agency always gives the manufacturer an opportunity to sue in district court to prevent the release of information,
manufacturers can as a practical matter delay providing health
and safety data to the public until after the substance has been
released, thereby effectively frustrating public participation in
the decision to release. Although no companies have so far been
this belligerent, the possibility still exists. Congress could remedy this problem by empowering the EPA to prevent the manufacture or distribution of a substance until all disputes over
health and safety data have been resolved.

E.

Willingness to Regulate

Part V of this Article related several disturbing indications
that the USDA may not be willing to regulate agricultural biotechnologies as effectively as the EPA would be. The USDA's
institutional conflict of interest and its numerous public statements accentuating the benefits and belittling the risks of biotechnology certainly justify some skepticism about the Agency's
desire to regulate agricultural biotechnologies. On the other
hand, the EPA has not been an especially aggressive regulator of
toxic substances and pesticides during the last several years, and
it does not have the USDA's expertise in animal biologics and
plant pests.
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Biotechnology can get off to the running start that its proponents desire only if the public can trust the regulatory agencies
that have been created to protect health and the environment.
Without strong public confidence in the agencies, the technology
may proceed, but it will face numerous delays and the possibility
of a complete loss of public trust when, as is almost inevitable,
something does go wrong. If the USDA's past activities and present pronouncements do not inspire the kind of public confidence that is necessary, at least three solutions are possible.
First, Congress can create an entirely new and independent
agency. This solution would be expensive and time consuming,
and it would no doubt be controversial at a time in which the
public mood seems antagonistic to new federal agencies. In any
event, it might well prove self-defeating, because the agency
would no doubt be staffed with many of the same people who
are currently running the programs in the USDA.
Second, Congress could transfer to the EPA all authority to
regulate agricultural biotechnologies. Although the EPA could
gear up to do the job and although the public may have marginally more confidence in the EP A's regulatory aggressiveness, this
solution would also be time consuming and expensive. In addition, it would necessarily involve jurisdictional battles in both
the House and the Senate where jurisdiction over agencies in the
USDA is lodged in one committee and jurisdiction over the EPA
is lodged in another committee. Finally, many of the same personnel would no doubt be transferred to the EPA as the USDA's
pesticides regulatory staff was transferred to the EPA in 1970.
Third, Congress could simply provide for overlapping jurisdiction in both the USDA and the EPA for functions that are now
assigned to the USDA alone. This could be accomplished with a
minimum of effort by amending the TSCA. This solution is obviously burdensome for the regulated industry, because applications for permits and licenses would have to be cleared through
both agencies. But this disadvantage may, in the long run, be
outweighed by the ease with which permitting decisions could be
made in a regulatory setting devoid of the suspicion that currently characterizes the public view of the USDA.
Even if Congress determines that no change in the institutional arrangements is desirable, the USDA could greatly enhance public confidence in its decisions by allowing the public to
play a much greater role in its decisionmaking, as previously
suggested. Providing notice to the public of pending license and
permit requests and allowing informed public comment would
be burdensome to the agency, and it might slow down the regu-
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latory process somewhat, but enhanced public trust in the
USDA's regulatory decisions may warrant these inconveniences.

F.

Conclusion

If current optimism about agricultural biotechnology is warranted, the USDA and the EPA should soon be flooded with applications for permits to test and market an astonishing variety
of useful products. If the past is an appropriate indicator, some
of these new products will pose risks to humans and to the environment. Both agencies have recognized the major roles that
they will play in protecting the public from the risks of agricultural biotechnologies, and both have adjusted their traditional
programs to meet their statutory obligations. Yet these efforts
have not yielded an adequate regulatory regime for biotechnology, especially insofar as the public is to play a role in the regulatory process. With relatively minor changes to existing statutes, however, Congress can pave the way for the establishment
of a regulatory regime that can give the public the protection
that it deserves without depriving society of the enormous benefits of these exciting new products.

